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In this article the author discusses contemporary trends in criminal
sentencing. The philosophies underlying criminal punishment are examined, as well as recent changes In the sentencing practices of a sample of
states. Data regarding actual sentencing practices in Wyoming are
analyzed, an assessment of sentencing disparity Is made, and recommendations for change are offered.

THE CHANGING STRUCTURE
OF CRIMINAL SENTENCING
by David J. Roberts*
The sentencing powers of the judges are, in short,
so far unconfined that, except for frequently monstrous
maximum limits, they are effectively subject to no law
at all. Everyone with the least training in law would be
prompt to denounce a statute that merely said the
penalty for crimes "shall be any term the judge sees fit
to impose." A regime of such arbitrary fiat would be intolerable in a supposedly free society, to say nothing of
being invalid under our due-process clause. But the fact
is that we have accepted unthinkingly a criminal code
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creating in effect precisely that degree of unbridled
power.1
Sentencing practices, penal philosophy, and correctional
intervention have, in recent years, been the subject of intense
criticism, debate, research and reform. During the past decade
we have witnessed the eclipse of rehabilitation as a fundamental goal of sentencing and corrections. Similarly, parole has
fallen into disfavor in many segments of society, and forces
seeking its abolition have prevailed in limited areas. 2 The indeterminate sentence, once heralded as providing "the best of
both worlds-long protection for the public yet a fully flexible
opportunity for the convict's rehabilitation," ' 3 lies fatally
wounded in the flurry of penal reform.
The quixotic aims of correctional reform during the 1950's
and 1960's have given way to the pragmatic and Spartan
theories of the 1970's and 1980's. Discussion of the criminal offender is no longer couched in the medico-legal jargon of
"reformation," "rehabilitation," "treatment," and "cure."
Gone are the notions that all offenders can be successfully
rehabilitated, the only stumbling block being the process of
matching the correct treatment strategy to the needs of the
client.
Today's treatises on sentencing and correctional intervention are littered with terms like "just deserts," "commensurate deserts," and "retribution." 4 The retributive aims of
punishment, once thought dead and discarded for their
perceived anachronistic barbarism, have been embraced by a
most unlikely constituency-the political right and left.
Liberals and conservatives alike have railed against the
1. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1975).
2. In 1976 the State of Maine became the first jurisdiction in recent years to abolish parole.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, SS1201-1206 (1977).
3. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 224 (1970).
4. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971); A. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976); J. FEINBERG, DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY (1970); D. FOGEL, "... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF...": THE JUSTICE
MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (1979); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976); A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE:
RETENTION, REFORM, OR ABOLITION (1979); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
(1974).
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indeterminate sentence, albeit with vastly different perceptions of its operation. 5 What has emerged is an uneasy alliance
pressing for remarkably similar reforms in sentencing and
corrections.
Determinate, fixed-term, mandatory, and presumptive
sentences, sentencing councils, sentencing and parole
guidelines, the abolition of parole, and the "justice model" of
corrections are all products of the research and rhetoric of the
past decade. Maine was the first state to abolish parole, though
its sentencing provisions still allow a wide range of judicial
discretion.6 California explicitly rejected the rehabilitative
ideal in sentencing that had once been its hallmark, and
specifically articulated punishment as the principal concern of
its new presumptive sentencing legislation. 7 Similarly, many
other states have substantially revised their criminal sentencing provisions and correctional practices.
The demise of the rehabilitative ideal and the indeterminate sentence may be traced to both practical and
theoretical considerations. The late Robert Martinson's study
of the effectiveness of correctional treatment programs
rendered the ominous verdict, "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far
have no appreciable effect on recidivism." Other researchers
have drawn similar conclusions. 9 Faced with mounting
evidence that rehabilitative efforts were not only ineffective,
but perhaps inefficacious, scholars and practitioners began
questioning the theoretical foundations of a correctional
system that embraced reformation of the offender as its
ultimate goal.
The rise of prisoners' rights during the 1960's and 1970's
brought the courts for the first time into direct contact with
the operation of correctional agencies. The "Hands-Off Doe5. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., eupra note 4; J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT

CRIME (1975)

6. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 1251 (1977).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE S 1170(aX1) (West 1981).

8. Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, THE PUB. INTEREST 25 (Spring 1974).
9. Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100 Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 153 (1966). But see Gottfredson, Treatment Destruction Techniques, 16 J.
RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 39-54 (1979).
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trine,"l 0 which historically had precluded judicial scrutiny of
correctional institutions, experienced a gradual erosion during
this period. 1 ' Perhaps more than any other factor, the impediments devised by prison officials to limit inmate access to
the judiciary were responsible for the initiation of judicial
review. 12 Establishing the primacy of the right to open and
unfettered access to the courts was, of necessity, a first step in
court intervention, for courts could hardly judge the constitutionality of any particular condition or practice if every petition was intercepted or censured.
The increasingly easy access to the courts which prisoners
enjoyed once the "Hands-Off Doctrine" was lifted brought a
flood of writs from prisoners challenging everything from
standards prescribing the length of an inmate's hair to torturous corporal punishment. A surprisingly consistent and
chronic complaint of inmates concerned the workings of the indeterminate sentence. Though viewed as humanitarian in
operation by those who urged its passage, the indeterminate
sentence backfired with savage force. Instead of motivating
the offender to participate in available rehabilitation programs
and receive a discharge at precisely the optimum rehabilitative
point, the indeterminate sentence hung like a noose over the
future of the offender. The prisoner had virtually no idea when
release would come or what those making the release decision
required. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, it took court action to
get the parole board to tell the prisoner why parole release had
been withheld.13 Prisoners began a fervent call for fixed-term
sentences which would establish a precise date of release.
A concurrent development with the growing body of
literature challenging the empirical basis of rehabilitation and
10. The "Hands-Off Doctrine," a term apparently coined by FRITCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF
FEDERAL PRISON INMATEs 31 (1961) (document prepared for the Federal Bureau of
Prisons), refers to the historical practice of appellate courts of denying Jurisdiction to
petitions from prison inmates challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of their
confinement. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:A Critique of JudicialRefusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
11. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776
(D.R.I. 1970); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Goldfarb
and Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970);
Turner, When PrisonersSue: A Study of PrisonerSection 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979).
12. Ex PARTE HULL, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 716 (1941).
13. Franklin v. Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole
Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971).
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the rising political voice of prisoners, was a fundamental questioning of the "justice" and "equity" of basing sentencing and
correctional release upon purely utilitarian aims. Disenchantment with the rehabilitative ideal on philosophical grounds
stemmed in part from its operational misuse. Prisoners were
spending considerably longer periods in confinement under the
well-intended strategy of reform and treatment. 14 The length
of time a person spent in prison bore no particular relationship
to the seriousness of the offense or to the extent of his prior
criminal record. 15 Questions of the "justice" of the sentencing
and correctional system began to surface with troublesome
frequency.
Indeterminacy in sentencing is an important issue in
Wyoming because of the extraordinarily broad penalty ranges
presently authorized in state statutes. The legislatively
authorized penalty for first degree sexual assault, 16 robbery
with a firearm,1 7 and armed burglary' 8 is "imprison[ment] in
the penitentiary for not less than five (5) years nor more than
fifty (50) years." 1 9 No other limitations are placed on the
sentencing judge with respect to the range of the sentence actually imposed. For example, the judge may impose a sentence
of five years to five years, five years to fifty years, fifty years
to fifty years, or any combination within the rather broad
14. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 4, at 91-96.
Three trends are significant in appraising the consequences of California's
adoption of the rehabilitative ideal. First, the length of sentences has steadily
increased. From 1959 to 1969 the median time served has risen from twentyfour to thirty-six months, the longest in the country. Second, the number of persons incarcerated per 100,000 has continued to rise, from 65 in 1944 to 145 in
1965. This figure too is the highest in the country. During a period when the
treatment ideal was maximized... more than twice as many persons served
twice as much time. Third, there is evidence that people are not being helped
any more by a median stay of three years in a rehabilitatively oriented prison
than they were by approximately two years in a basically punitively oriented
prison.
Id. at 91-92 (emphasis in original).
15. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 49-50 (Tent. Draft,

1967); J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS (1971); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
L. SUTTON,FEDERAL SENTENCING PATTERNS: A STUDY OF GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATIONS,

ANALYTIC REP. 18 (1978); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, L. SUTTON, VARIATIONS IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: A STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT AT THE NAT'L LEVEL, ANALYTIC

REP. 17 (1978); Morgan, Disparity and the Sentencing Process in Wyoming District
Courts: Recommendationsfor Change, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 525 (1976).
16. WYO. STAT. SS 6-4-302 and 306(aXi) (1977).
17. WYO. STAT. S 6-4-402 (1977).
18. WYO. STAT. S 6-7-201(b) (1977).
19. WYO. STAT. S 6-4-402 (1977).
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legislative authorization. 20 The parole board can release an inmate only after he has served the minimum sentence imposed
by the court 21 (assuming no sentence change is subsequently
authorized by the judge or the Governor). Good time awards,

that is, awards granted for acceptable behavior in the institution, reduce only the maximum sentence, do not accelerate
parole eligibility, and cannot reduce a sentence below the court
22
imposed minimum.
This article will examine the changing structure and

climate of criminal sentencing and punishment in the United
States, and in Wyoming in particular. The article is divided into four sections: a discussion of retributive and utilitarian

philosophies in criminal sentencing; a review of recent changes
in sentencing and parole legislation throughout the United
States; an analysis of current sentencing and correctional

practices in Wyoming; and, finally, recommendations for
change.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT

Any discussion of the purposes of penal sanctions must

begin with the now familiar litany of penal philosophies:
rehabilitation, incapacitation, general deterrence, and retribution.2 3 These philosophies have traditionally been dichotomized

into the utilitarian and the retributive aims of the criminal law.
Though the present debate is thought-provoking, it is anything
but new. One need only review the works of Kant, Hegel,
20. While Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-201 (1977) mandates that sentencing judges "shall not fix a
definite term of imprisonment," WYo. STAT. S 7-13-202 (1977) expressly provides that
such a sentence "shall not for that reason be void."
21. WYo. STAT. S 7-13402(a) (1977) provides that the Board of Parole has the power to grant
parole "to any person imprisoned in any institution under sentence ordered by any
district court of this state, other than a life sentence, and who shall have served the
minimum term pronounced by the trial court ... " See also Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of
Parole, Ch. V, S 2 (1974); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 84 (1974). It should be noted that Wyo. R.
CRIM. P. 36 authorizes the sentencing court to reduce a criminal sentence within 120 days
of its imposition. Further, the Governor has the power to commute any sentence imposed
by a district court. Wyo. CONST. art. 4, S 5; Wyo. STAT. SS7-13-801 to -809 (1977
22. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. IV, S 1 (1974).
23. Deterrence is typically divided into "special deterrence" and "general deterrence." H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 39-48 (1968). Special deterrence refers
to the inhibition of further criminality in an offender through the imposition of punishment. General deterrence, by contrast, refers to the inhibition of criminality in the
general public throught the threat of punishment. Id. For the purpose of this paper
special deterrence will be included within the general category of rehabilitation, since it
primarily concerns the modification of the offender's behavior by imposition of
punishment.
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to name a few, to realize the
Beccaria, Bentham, and Romilly,
24
dialectic.
the
of
longevity
Utilitarian philosophy is grounded in the prescription of
the greatest good for the greatest number. 25 It is forwardlooking in as much as criminal penalties are authorized in order
to reform the miscreant, restrain his harmful actions through
incapacitation, and deter the general public, as well as the offender himself, from future depredations. Though punishment
itself is viewed as an evil, its imposition is justified by the
greater good affected through these reformative, restraining,
and deterrent functions.
Rehabilitation
Traditionally, the concept of rehabilitation views the
criminal offender in the general framework of the medical
model. The offensive behavior of the individual is believed to
stem from biological, psychological, social, or environmental
disorders. The aim of the penal system, then, is the treatment
of the "patient" or "client." Indeed, during the 1950's and
1960's we saw a concurrent change in the vocabulary
surrounding the penal system. Penitentiaries became correctional institutions, guards became correctional officers, and
punishment became treatment.
Commentators during the 1960's and 1970's viewed
rehabilitation as the panacea to the crime problem that loomed
predominant on the social scene. 26 Viewed as humanizing our
monolithic penal institutions at a time when prisoners were
gaining political voice and other social reforms were taking
place, rehabilitation was embraced with a fervent innocence:
"Rehabilitation must be the goal of modern corrections. Every
other consideration should be subordinated to it. To
rehabilitate is to give health, freedom from drugs and alcohol,
24. See, e.g., C. PHILLIpSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAW REFORMERS (1923); PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVEs ON PUNSHMENT (G. Ezorsky ed. 1972);, THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (C. Morris ed. 1959).

25. See ge=y

Bentham, An Introduction to the Principlewof Morals andLegislation, in

PHILOSOPCAL PERSPECTrvES, supra note 24, at 56.
26. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1974, at 171-76 (M. Hindelang, C.

Dunn, A. Aumick, & L. Sutton eds. 1975) (public opinion surveys during 1960's and
1970's indicated substantial concern for safety and the perception of increasing crime
rates).
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to provide education, vocational training, understanding and
27
the ability to contribute to society."
Given the idealistic timbre of the refom movement of the
1960's, it is not difficult to understand the move to indeterminate sentencing. The indeterminate sentence, it was believed, would allow correctional officials to release an offender
from confinement at the precise point of reformation, thus
returning a useful and productive citizen to the community and
averting needless punishment to one who no longer posed a
threat to society. There existed, however, a truculent breach
between the philosophy and the practice, which will be discussed in detail shortly.
Incapacitation
The incapacitation of those who have demonstrated their
dangerousness to the community by the commission of a
criminal act is perhaps the most conspicuous and, arguably,
the most easily attainable goal in corrections. Isolating these
persons from society is rather like quarantining persons with
contagious diseases. 28 Though incarceration prevents the offender from preying upon the general public, prisons are
notorious for the amount of crime that is committed within
their walls.2 9 Given this fact, incapacitation is at best only
marginally successful. That 99 percent of all prisoners are
ultimately released from confinement further testifies to the
fact that isolation, as an ultimate goal in corrections, is only
temporary.3 0
The rationale underlying incapacitation is the belief that,
unless restrained, the convict will continue a course of criminal
conduct. While intuitively appealing, contemporary research
27. CLARK, supra note 3, at 220. For comprehensive contemporary discussions of rehabilitation, see NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (S.Martin,
L. Sechrest, & R. Redner eds. 1981); THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (L. Sechrest, S. White, & E. Brown eds. 1979).
28. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION 243 (1975).
29. S. REID, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY 633-43 (2d ed. 1979); H. TOCH, POLICE, PRISONS, AND
THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE 52-73 (1977).
30. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 145
(1973).
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seriously questions our ability to accurately predict individual
dangerousness.3 1
While current attempts at incapacitation appear only partially effective, some commentators have urged that the principle is right, but the practice has faltered. Ernest van den
Haag, for example, has proposed a system of protracted con32
finement, which he calls "post-punishment incapacitation."
An ardent utilitarian, van den Haag calls for the confinement
of criminal offenders who are predicted to be dangerous, even
beyond their period of "deserved" punishment, though he
would attempt to mitigate the pain of restraint and make it as
non-punitive as possible. 33
Must we then let offenders go after they have served their time, even when we foresee danger? If justice
were our only aim, we could do nothing else: fiatjustitia
pereat mundus. But the preservation of society and the
security and welfare of its members are legitimate
political ends beyond justice.... Surely, then, once having punished offenders for their offenses, we may incapacitate them when we have reason to believe that
they will unlawfully harm others if released and that the
harm and the likelihood of it are great enough to
outweigh the harm the3 4preventive restriction on their
freedom does to them.
Substantive questions challenging the justice of a system like
that proposed by van den Haag must surface where the order
for continued confinement is based solely on predictions of
future danger.
Rehabilitation and incapacitation share an important
characteristic which distinguishes them from the other penal
philosophies: an emphasis on individualized decisionmaking.
These two philosophies focus upon the actor, not the act, except to the extent that the act may reveal elements of the
BU
a note 4, at
supra note 28, at 245-46; Steadman and Knevees,The Com-

31. DOING JUSTICE, supranote 4, at 19-26; THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT,

68-72; E. VAN DEN

HAAG,

munity Adjustment and CriminalActivity of the Baxstrom Patients:1966-1970, 129 AM.

J. PSYCHIATRy 304-10 (1972); von Hirsch, Predictionof Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 717 (1972).
VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 28, at 241-51.
33. Id. at 250.
34. Id. at 243.

32. E.
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pathology or the danger of the offender. This allows the judge
or corrections official to prescribe vastly different sanctions
for virtually identical criminal acts, based upon differences in
offender characteristics. Thus, disparity in sentencing is not
an artifact of an unjust process, but rather, it is a design
element characteristic of decisionmaking tailored to the
individual.
Disparity in sentencing has been well documented.3 5 John
Hogarth, in his excellent work Sentencing as a Human Process,3 6 investigated a host of factors which were found to interact with judicial decision making. Interestingly, though
perhaps not surprisingly, the importance attached to any particular penal philosophy by the sentencing judge substantially
affected both the type of sentence and the length of sentence
he imposed. 7 The philosophy espoused by the magistrate also
significantly governed his interpretation of pre-sentence information:
[M]agistrates who see a great deal of pathology in
the area of family and personal relationships tended to
have relatively high reformation and punishment corrects scores and relatively low general deterrence,
The attitudes and
retribution, and justice scores ....
penal philosophies of magistrates appear to function as
filters through which information is perceived selectively38

The critical point here is that sentencing and correctional
decisionmaking under the indeterminate sentence are largely
35.
36.
37.
38.

See generally sources cited supra note 15.
HOGARTH, supra note 15.
Id. at 322-40.
Id. at 276. The "punishment corrects" and "justice" scores are factors statistically derived from the attitudes and philosophies of the magistrates examined by Hogarth.
"Justice" refers to a sentencing judge "concerned with justice [who] would not only ensure that the punishment is severe enough, bearing in mind the seriousness of the offence, but also that it must not exceed the limit that is appropriate for the offence." Id. at
128. "Punishment corrects" is a factor which is "associated with the notion that offenders deserve and need punishment, in order to prevent them from committing further
crime." Id.
"Reformation," "general deterrence," and "retribution" are penal philosophies with
which magistrates indicated agreement to a greater or lesser degree. "Reformation" was
defined as "[t]he attempt to change the offender through treatment or corrective
measures, so that when given the chance he will refrain from committing crime." Id. at
70. "General deterrence' was defined as the "attempt to impose a penalty on the offender before the court sufficiently severe that potential offenders among the general
public will refrain from committing crime through fear of punishment." Id. "Retribution"
was defined by Hogarth as the "attempt to impose a just punishment on the offender, in
the sense of being in proportion to the severity of the crime and his culpability, whether
or not such a penalty is likely to prevent further crime in him, or others." Id,
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governed by the judge's perception of both the danger and the
rehabilitative potential of the offender. Hogarth has shown
that judges, like all humans, selectively perceive and interpret
the vast quantity of data thrust upon them, and their perceptions and interpretations are tempered by the penal
philosophies they hold, as well as a host of other demographic
factors.3 9 This data rather convincingly demonstrates the importance of narrowing the range of available penal sanctions
and providing an explicit statement of the philosophical
perspective which is to govern sentencing and correctional
decision making.
Deterrence
The aim of general deterrence is the inhibition of criminal
behavior in members of the general public through the threat
and imposition of punishment. General deterrence possesses
an eloquent logical simplicity which has garnered broad
popular appeal and acceptance. Judges, legislators, scholars,
and the general public frame their discussions of the effectiveness of criminal penalties largely in terms of the deterrent
capacity of punishment. Whether the death penalty exhibits a
deterrent capacity superior to protracted confinement has
been the subject of virulent debates and perhaps exhaustive,
though inconclusive, research. 40 The Wyoming legislature has
recently increased the severity and certainty of punishment
for those apprehended for drunk driving, with the aim of
41
general deterrence in mind.
Deterrence functions where the punishment imposed is
proportionate in severity to the offense committed, its certainty is great, and it is sufficiently swift to relate the sanction to
the criminal act. 42 The severity of the punishment must be
39. Id. at 211-28.
40. See genmraUy CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds.
1976); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (H. Bedau ed. 1964); F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
41. Wyo. STAT. S 31-5-233(d) (1977). The 1980 revision mandated confinement for a
minimum of one day and specifically placed this one day minimum beyond the reach of
probation, pardon, parole, commutation, or suspension. 1980 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 58, S
1. The 1981 session of the legislature repealed this penalty section. 1981 WYo. SESS.
LAWS Ch. 12, S 1. In 1982, the legislature added section (h), which limits the authority of
the prosecutor to plea bargain: "Any person charged under this section shall be prosecuted under this section and not under a reduced charge." 1982 Wyo. SESS. LAWS Ch.
50, S 1 codified at Wyo. STAT. S 31-5-233(h) (Supp. 1982).
42. C. BECGARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (H. Paolucci trans. 1963); Bentham, supra
note 25.
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commensurate to the seriousness of the crime and outweigh by
some quantum the pleasure which can be derived from the act.
Where the penalty is disproportionately severe, it will rarely
be imposed; where it is too lenient, crime will be indulged. The
certainty of punishment must assure the potential offender
that pain will inevitably result should the offense be committed. The time interval between the commission of the crime
and the imposition of punishment must be sufficiently brief inorder for the offender to realize that his misbehavior
precipitated the penal sanction.
The deterrent capacity of the criminal law has been the
topic of a considerable amount of research over the years. Current research regarding the superior deterrent function of the
death penalty is inconclusive, and perhaps it is destined to remain so. 4 The ability of the criminal law to deter undesirable
behavior, however, has been successfully demonstrated under
certain circumstances. 44
Measuring the deterrent capability of criminal sanctions is
an extraordinarily complex task. The importance ascribed to
different elements of basic deterrence theory is a matter of
continuing research. For example, it is not clear whether the
certainty of punishment or the severity of the penalty is more
important in. deterring criminal behavior.
Retribution
Retribution is an ambiguous term typically employed in
discussions of the condemnatory function of criminal punish43. See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 40; THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 40; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 40. For an excellent discussion of the current state of knowledge regarding both deterrence and incapacitation, see DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978).

44. The British Road Safety Act of 1967, for example, was successful in reducing the incidence of drunk driving and the number of alcohol-related automobile accidents. Ross,
Law, Science and Accidents: The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1973). Similarly, prophylactic measures instituted at airports in response to airline hijackings during the 1970's substantially reduced the incidence of this crime. Landes, An
Economic Study of US. Aircraft Hyjacking, 1961-1976, 21 J.L. & ECONOMICS 1 (1978).
Significantly increasing the number and presence of police officers on the New York City

subways during critical periods of the day also resulted in deterrence. Chaiken, Lawless
and Stevenson, The Impact ofPolice Activity in Crime:Robberies in the New York City
Subway System (1974) in Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence:Laying the Ground

work for the Second Decade, 248 (Table 2) in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW
OF RESEARCH 211-68 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1980). See generally, F. ZIMRING,
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (1973); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 40.
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ment. From the strict lex talionisof the past, 45 retribution has
undergone a recent metamorphosis. Today's treatises on the
philosophy of punishment are steeped in terms like "just
deserts" and "commensurate deserts." 46 The punitive aim of
punishment, repudiated not that long ago, has resurfaced in
recent years in the idea of desert.
The punishment of criminals comprehends a vast array of
functions for society. The condemnation of the act, as well as
the actor, the requital of evil, the balancing of rights, and the
sovereign expression of vengeance are all elements of retribution. Another critically important element of retribution is
"desert."
Desert occupies a unique role in the notion of retributive
punishment. As Andrew von Hirsch points out, "[A]sk the person on the street why a wrongdoer should be punished, and he
is likely to say that he 'deserves' it."' ' 4 Further questioning of
von Hirsch's "man on the street" might elicit a response menexpressed above, as well
tioning several of the social functions
48
as some of the utilitarian aims.
The purpose of desert, with respect to criminal punishment, differs from that of the other social functions of retribution. These other social functions, like incapacitation, deterrence and rehabilitation, are objectives sought by society
through the imposition of punishment. Desert, on the other
hand, is a limiting principle which restrains the power a
sovereign may justifiably exercise over its citizens. When we
say a person is to be punished because he deserves punishment,
what we mean is that the person's behavior has met whatever
legal and procedural qualifications we have established to
45. Lex talionis refers to the ancient principle of retaliation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 822
(5th ed. 1979). See also H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HoIizoNS IN CRIMINOLOGY
337-40 (2d ed. 1952). The traditional conception of retribution as a simplistic retaliatory
principle stems in part from the well-worn quote of Immanuel Kant:

Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island
resolving to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world-the
last Murderer lying in the prison ought to be executed before the resolution
was carried out.
Kant, Kant's Philosophy ofLaw, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 24, at

258.
46. See generally sources cited supra note 4.
47. DOING JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 45.

48. See supra text accompanying notes 23-44.
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distinguish those who may justly be penalized from those who
may not. Simply put, desert tells us that we may punish only
those who deserve punishment. Conviction of a crime is the
minimum qualification for cirminal punishment in the United
States.
Desert also exercises a delimiting role when we discuss the
quantum of punishment which may be imposed. Once we have
identified those individuals who are deserving of punishment,
we must face the question of how much punishment may
justifiably be imposed. The precision with which desert
answered our first question (who may be punished?) is woefully
lacking in addressing the second. Desert tells us that we may
not punish a person more severely than he deserves for the
crime(s) committed. Whether there exists a concurrent
prescription against punishing him less than he deserves is a
49
matter of some controversy.
The function of desert, therefore, is to limit the exercise of
punishment in civilized society. We do not punish simply
because the person "deserves it." Rather, we punish to
achieve social benefits. Our efforts in achieving these benefits,
if we are to obey the dictates of justice, must take into account
the restrictions imposed by desert.
The Purpose of Punishment
The philosophies of punishment thus briefly sketched, it is
now appropriate to outline the proper role of the retributive
and utilitarian goals of criminal punishment. General deterrence and the desert element of retribution have different
functions, answer different questions, and are imbued with
quite dissimilar limitations. The codification of a set of formalized laws and penalties has, as its general purpose, the
prevention of evil. Though the deterrent effect of the criminal
49. Compare THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, supra note 4, at 74-75 uwtA Armstrong, The
Retributivist Hits Back, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 24, at 136. Arm-

strong notes:
[JJustice gives the appropriate authority the right to punish iffenders up to
some limit, but one is not necessarily and invariably obliged to punish to the
limit of justice. Similarly, if I lend a man money I have a right, in justice, to
have it returned; but if I choose not to take it back I have not done anything
unjust.
Armstrong, supra at 136 (emphasis in original).
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law is not precisely measurable, evidence does demonstrate
that the amount of crime in society is measurably reduced
where laws exist and their enforcement is manifest.50
General deterrence gives us reason for the implementation
and operation of an organized system of criminal justice. Further, relying on principles enunciated over two centuries ago
by Beccaria and Bentham, deterrence dictates with some
measure of specificity the factors governing the severity and
celerity of punishment. It does not, however, and cannot
answer all of the questions.
The classic objection to the purely utilitarian penal
philosophy is that it contains inadequate constraints on the
power exercised by a sovereign in pursuit of deterrence. An innocent man, for example, who is popularly believed to be guilty
would admirably serve the objectives of general deterrence,
where the public spectacle of punishment is all important.5 1
Though the deterrent effect of the law would swiftly diminish
if it were perceived that punishment is randomly allocated, this
concern by itself insufficiently encumbers the punitive powers
of the state. While deterrence is the objective of the law,
desert established the limits within which a state may pursue
its objective.
Both the American Law Institute and the American Bar
Association have proposed standards regarding sentencing
which have received broad acceptance and have been used as
models for the drafting of much state legislation. The ALI
Model Penal Code5 2 and the ABA Standards Relating to
53 each urge the
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
primacy of the least restrictive sanction in selecting among
alternative dispositions in sentencing, and both recommend
the same triad of elements which would authorize a sentence of
imprisonment: 1) incapacitation to prevent future crime; 2)
50. See generally ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 40.
a purely
system,
for instance,
it matters
aot who
punished
provded
51. "In
somebody
is deterrent
punished and
the public
persuaded
that henot
is guilty.
Theiseffect
of hanging
or
imprisoning the wrong man is as deterrent as hanging or imprisoning the right one."
Shaw, Imprisonment, in BERNARD SHAW: SELECTED PROSE 874 (1. Russell ed. 1952).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE S 7.01 (1962).
53. ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, STANDARD 2.5(c) (Ap-

proved Draft 1968).
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total confinement to insure rehabilitation; and54 3) a crime too
serious to allow another form of punishment.
To base sentences of confinement upon predictions of
dangerousness or rehabilitative treatment, however, puts us
on dangerous ground. When we base a decision to imprison on
the predicted dangerousness of an individual, we fail to constrain our punishment to that which is deserved for the
criminal act(s) committed. What we do in effect is punish for
acts which we predict will occur in the future. Moreover, we
strain at the very boundaries of our empirical capabilities, for
studies have amply demonstrated that we are lamentably ineffective in accurately predicting dangerousness.5 5 Similarly, to
base a decision to sentence an individual to penal confinement
on the perceived rehabilitative potential of the person or program assumes a predictive capability far exceeding our present methods.5 6 The simple fact is that we don't know how to
rehabilitate criminal offenders. Parumproficit scire quidfieri
debet, si non cognoscas quomodo sit fatturum.57
There are, of course, substantial philosophical questions
that linger when treatment is the overriding concern in imposing a prison sentence. The tyranny of a sentencing system does
not abate simply because the purpose is benevolent. As C. S.
Lewis has noted:
It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can
be just or unjust .... Thus when we cease to consider
what the criminal deserves and consider only what will
cure him or deter others, we have tacitly removed him
from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject or rights, we now have a mere object, a
patient, a "case."158
54. ABA Standard 2.5(c) provides in part:
(c) A sentence not involving total confinement is to be preferred in the
absence of affirmative reasons to the contrary. Examples of legitimate reasons
for the selection of total confinement in a given case are:
(i) Confinement is necessary in order to protect the public from further criminal activity by the defendant; or
(ii) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment which can most
effectively be provided if he is placed in total confinement; or
(iii) It would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense to impose a sentence other than total confinement.
55. See generally sources cited supra note 31.
56. Id.
57. "It profits little to know what ought to be done, if you do not know how it is to be done."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 1011.
58. Lewis, The HumanitarianTheory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 302 (S.
Grupp ed. 1971).
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Principled sentencing requires that desert play a central
role in establishing who will be subject to punishment and how
much punishment will be imposed. General deterrence plays a
dual role, providing the fundamental rationale underlying our
system of laws and penalties, and also assisting in the selection
of the appropriate penalty in the individual case. Rehabilitation and incapacitation are objectives that must be subordinated to both the deterrent and desert prescriptions, but we
should not shun them entirely. While we should not base the
decision to imprison solely on the need for treatment, once the
decision to incarcerate has been made-on desert and deterrent grounds-our efforts should be directed toward providing
rehabilitative programs for the offenders. 59
Traditionally legislatures have provided little if any direction regarding the philosophy underlying and guiding the
criminal sanctioning process. Typically, the sentencing provisions of state statutes are prefaced by preambles notable more
for their ambiguity and all-encompassing philosophical aims
than a set of principles strictly governing the power the
sovereign may exercise over its constituency.
The only real guidance to sentencing principles in Wyoming is contained in the state constitution, which proclaims,
"The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of
reformation and prevention." 60 Virtually no other direction is
provided. 61 Without an adequate philosophical foundation
upon which to premise our penal system, judges lack sufficient
direction in establishing the primacy of competing penal
philosophies. As former U.S. District Judge Marvin Frankel
has noted: "We have in our country virtually no legislative
declarations of the principles justifying criminal sanctions....
[T]his is much more than an aesthetically regrettable lack. It is
the omission of foundation stones, without which no stable or
62
reliable structure is possible."
59. See THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT, supranote 4, at 1-28 for a compelling discussion of
the problems associated with coerced treatment and the importance of making
rehabilitative programs voluntary.
60. Wyo. CONST. art. 1, S 15.
61. WYO. STAT. S 7-13-201 (1977) mandates simply that the sentence imposed by the district
court be within the minimum and maximum statutory ranges. The statutes provide no
discussion of the principles which should govern the selection of an incarcerative as opposed to a non-incarcerative sentence.
62. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 106.
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Certainly it would be difficult to establish a statutory set of
principles so comprehensive that it would articulate the
sentence to be preferred in each and every case. This, of
course, is neither needed nor desirable. Legislation should,
however, at a minimum establish a paradigm articulating the
proper role of competing penal philosophies.
RECENT CHANGES IN CRIMINAL SENTENCING

During the past decade we have witnesed a substantial
change in the sentencing and correctional practices in a growing number of states throughout the country. Discretion once
vested in the sentencing judge, the correctional official, and
the parole authority has been severely constrained or
eliminated. The indeterminate sentence, once the hallmark of
the rehabilitative ideal, has fallen into disfavor, and in its wake
we have seen a variety of mechanisms arise which are designed
to increase determinacy in the time-setting function. These
mechanisms include fixed-term sentencing, non-discretionary
parole release (where parole continues to exist), and the
vesting of earned good time, to mention just a few.
California and Colorado have each substantially revised
their sentencing and correctional practices in recent years.
The changes extend far beyond mere cosmetic modifications;
they demonstrate a change in the very character of the sanctioning process. A key to the fundamental nature of these
reforms is the philosophical perspective within which the
reforms are framed.
California, a state once known for its unflinching acceptance of the rehabilitative ideal and the vastness of its sentencing discretion, has recently modified its sentencing and correctional apparatus. 63 Rehabilitation is no longer the primary objective of criminal sentencing. Indeed, California has left little
to the imagination in declaring the purposes of sentencing:
63. CAL. PENAL CODE S 1170(aXl) (West Supp. 1982). See also A. LIPSON & M. PETERSON,
CALIFORNIA JUSTICE UNDER DETERMINATE SENTENCING: A REVIEW AND AGENDA FOR

RESEARCH (Report No. R-2497-CRB prepared for the State of California, Bd. of Prison
Terms) (1980); Lagoy, Hussey, and Kramer, A ComparativeAssessment of Determinate
Sentencing in the FourPioneer States, 24 CRIME & DELINQ. 385400 (1978); Messinger
and Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute: History and Issues, in
DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? 13-58 (Mar. 1978) (Proceedings
of the Special Conference on Determinate Sentencing, June 2-3, 1977, Boalt Hall School
of Law, University of California, Berkeley).
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The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of
imprisonment for crime is punishment. This purpose is
best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense with provision for uniformity in the
sentences of offenders committing the same offense
under similar circumstances. The Legislature further
finds and declares that the elimination of disparity and
the provision of uniformity of sentences can best be
achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in
proportion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legislature64 to be imposed by the court
with specified discretion.
California has thus declared, in uncommonly explicit language,
that the controlling factors in establishing the length of a
prison term are 1) uniformity in sentencing, 2) punishment
proportionate in severity to the seriousness of the crime, and
3) strictly limited judicial discretion.
Colorado, while not as explicitly as California, has placed a
heavy emphasis on the concept of criminal desert in the revision of its sentencing practices, but has retained and emphasized its commitment to deterrence and rehabilitation:
Purposes of code with respect to sentencing. (1) The
purposes of this code with respect to sentencing are:
(a) To punish a convicted offender by assuring the
imposition of a sentence he deserves in relation to
the seriousness of his offense;
(b) To assure the fair and consistent treatment of all
convicted offenders by eliminating unjustified
disparity in sentences, providing fair warning of the
nature of the sentence to be imposed, and
establishing fair procedures for the imposition of
sentences.
(c) To prevent crime and promote respect for the
law by providing an effective deterrent to others
likely to commit similar offenses; and
(d) To promote rehabilitation by encouraging correctional programs that elicit the voluntary cooperation and participation of convicted offenders. 5
64. CAL. PENAL CODE S 1170(aXl) (West. Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
65. COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-1-102.5 (Supp. 1982).
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Colorado has constructed a philosophical framework that
comprehends the complex array of penal functions our sanctions are designed to accommodate. Striking a reasonable
balance between retributive strictures and utilitarian objectives, this new sentencing and correctional legislation has
recognized the importance of equity in decisionmaking as well
as the deterrent and rehabilitative aims to which any reasoned
penal system must direct itself.
Colorado's legislation is a fairly comprehensive model
establishing the relative importance of several competing
penal philosophies. The primary function of the penal code is to
assure the equitable treatment of those who enter the system.
Thus, the concept of criminal desert emerges as the governing
force in criminal punishment. Within the confines of deserved
punishment, Colorado has announced the purposes of legal
sanctions: deterrence and rehabilitation. Rehabilitation programs are designed to be voluntary in nature. Although
rehabilitation is encouraged, a prisoner's release from confinement will neither be accelerated nor delayed on the basis of
participation or non-participation in institutional programs.
Although many jurisdictions share common concerns and
objectives in modifying their criminal sentencing system, the
actual penalty provisions enacted into legislation vary considerably from state to state. California's is perhaps the most
rigorous of the early reform efforts. Eliminating parole release
discretion and stricly narrowing judicial discretion,
California's new penal code provides offenses with neatly circumscribed sentencing ranges. 66 In contrast, Maine, Indiana
and Illinois continue to grant the sentencing judge wide
latitude in decisionmaking.67 Colorado's code demonstrates
something of a compromise by providing a reasonably narrow
range of presumptive sentences, yet still allowing the judge to
sentence outside of these ranges where aggravating or
mitigating factors are present. 68 Table 1 presents a comparison of the sentencing and correctional provisions of a sample of states.
66. For a direct comparison, see generally CAL. PENAL CODE SS 1170-1170.7 (West Supp.
1982) and infra Table 1 (accompanying notes 69-87).
67. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 1252 (1983); IND. CODE ANN. SS 35-50-2-3 to -2-8 (Burns
1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-1-105 (Supp. 1982).
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Tab]
Sentencing Provisions:
69
A Comparison of a Sample of States
CALIFORNIA: 70
Good time: 4 months for 8 months
served.7 1 Earned good time
vests every 8 months.

Presumptive
Sentence

Range in
Aggravation

+1
+1
+1
+1

6 years
4 years

3 years
2 years

year
year
year
year

Range in
Mitigation

-1 year
-1 year
-1 year
-8 months

Parole: Nondiscretionary re72
lease. One year parole for
all offenders.

Example(s)

Murder (second degree)
Rape; sale of heroin
Robbery (unarmed); manslaughter
Burglary; grand theft

MAINE :7
74

Good time: 10 days per month regular.

7
Parole: Abolished. 5

2 days per month special.
Class

Maximum term

Murder

Life or any term of
imprisonment that is
not less than 25 years
20 years
None
10 years
$10,000

Cl ass A
Cl ass B
CI$ass C

Class D
Class E

Fine (max.)

5 years

$ 2,500

1 year
6 months

$ 1,000
$ 500

Example(s)

Felony Murder; kidnapping; rape
Trafficking in narcotic drugs;
robbery (unarmed); theft ($5,000 +)
Manslaughter by motor vehicle;
burglary (unarmed, no injury)
Unlawful gambling
Prostitution; theft (less than $500)

76

INDIANA:

73
Parole: Released after expiration
of maximum less good-time. Terminated after one year if no parole
revocation.
69. The material for the states of California, Maine, Indiana and Illinois, as well as the format
of the table, was drawn directly from Lagoy, supra note 63. The material on good time
and parole was not contained in their original table, but was added by the author. The
material for Colorado was compiled by the author.

77
Good time: Class I = 1 day for each day served.
Class II = 1 day for every two days.
Class III = no good time.

70. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE SS 1170-1170.7 (West Supp. 1982).
71. CAL. PENAL CODE S 2931(b) (West Supp. 1982).
72. CAL. PENAL CODE SS 3040-3065 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983).
73. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, SS 1251-1256 (1983).
74. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, SS1253(3-A) and (4) (1983).
75. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A (1983).
76. IND. CODE ANN. SS35-50-2-3 to -2-7 (Burns 1979).
77. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-6-3 (Burns 1979).
78. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-6-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1982).
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Class

Presumptive Range in
Range in
Sentence Aggravation Mitigation Fine (max.) Example(s)

Murder79
Class A
Class B
Class C
Class D80

40 years + 20 years -10 years $10,000
30 years + 20 years -10 years $10,000 Kidnappir ig (for ransom); dealing in major narcotics.
10 years + 10 years - 4 years $10,000 Rape; armed robbery
5 years + 3 years- 3 years $10,000 Robbery (unarmed);
burglary
2 years + 2 years
0
$10,000 Theft

ILLINOIS:81
82

Good time: One day for each day
served. Up to 90 days for
meritorious service. Does
not vest, but not more than
1 year of credit may be
revoked.
Regular
Terms

Class

Murder

Extended
Terms

Parole: Nondiscretionary "Man-83
datory Supervised Release
Term" imposed by the sentencing judge based upon
the class of the offense.

Example(s)

Life or
Life or
20-40 years 40-80 years
Mandatory

Habitual

Criminal8'

Life

6-30 years 30-60 years Rape; armed robbery; aggravated
kidnapping
4-15 years 15-30 years Dealing in major narcotics
3- 7 years 7-14 years Burglary; arson; robbery (unarmed); voluntary manslaughter
2- 5 years 5-10 years Theft (over $150); involuntary
manslaughter; aggravated battery
1- 3 years 3- 6 years Possession of marijuana (30-50
grams); sale of child pornography

Class X
Class 1
Class 2
Class 3
Class 4

85

COLORADO

Good time: Fifteen days per monthParole: Nondiscretionary release. 87
which vests semiannually.
One year parole for all
Earned time not to
offenders.
exceed fifteen days every
six months.
79. The death sentence may be imposed in instances where the state proves the existence of
aggravating circumstances as defined by law. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-2-9 (Burns 1979).
80. The judge has the discretion to treat such offenses as Class A misdemeanors. IND. CODE
ANN. S 35-50-2-7(b) (Burns 1979).
81. See generaUy ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
82. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1003-6-3 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
83. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1982).
84. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1(aX2) (Smith-Hurd 1982). Habitual criminals are defined as persons with two prior convictions for murder or Class X offenses. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, S 33B-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
85. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-1-105 (Supp. 1982).
86. COLO. REv. STAT. SS 17-22.5-101 and -102 (Supp. 1982
87. COLO. REV. STAT. S 17-22.5-103 (Supp. 1982).
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Range

Class

Range in
Aggravation

Example(s)

1st Degree Murder

Class 2

Life imprisonment or
death
8-12 years

+ 12 years

Class 3

4- 8 years

+ 8 years

Class 4

2- 4 years

+ 4 years

Class 5

1- 2 years

+ 2 years

Class 1

Range in
Mitigation

613

-4 years 2nd degree murder;
1st degree kidnapping; 1st degree sex.
asit. (injury)
-2 years 1st degree assault;
1st degree burglary;
aggravated robbery
- 1 year Manslaughter; robbery; 2nd degree
theft
assault;
($200-$1o,ooo)
-6 months Criminal impersonation; 1st degree
criminal trespass

In California the judge is directed to impose a definite term
of years in sentencing the convicted felon.88 The presumptive
sentence identified in Table 1 is mandated, except for cases in
which an aggravating or mitigating factor listed by statute is
present. Where the judge imposes a sentence either above or
below the prescribed presumptive term, he must set forth the
facts on which he relied. 89 An interesting and seemingly
paradoxical provision of California's law is the provision of
good time. All inmates earn good time at the rate of three
months for every eight months served. 90 However, inmates
may earn an additional month off their sentence every eight
months for participation in rehabilitative programs. 91 This
system appears inconsistent because even though rehabilita92
tion is eliminated as a principle function of the penal process,
offenders may earn reasonably substantial reductions to their
sentences for participation in programs traditionally conceived
of as rehabilitative.
Maine's revised criminal code varies significantly from
California's. Instead of limiting the entire range of available
88. CAL. PENAL CODE SS 1170(aX2) and (b) (West Supp. 1982).
89.
90.
91.
92.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.

PENAL
PENAL
PENAL
PENAL

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

S
S
S
S

1170(b) (West Supp. 1982).
2931(b) (West Supp. 1983).
2931(c) (West Supp. 1983).
1170(aXi) (West Supp. 1982).
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penal sanctions, Maine has enacted legislation that places only
upper limits on the penal sanctions available. 93 The sentencing
judge must impose a definite term of years but the term is
limited only by the applicable maximum provided by statute.
For a Class A felony this amounts to a considerable amount of
94
discretion.
Indiana's penal code establishes presumptive sentences for
each of four classes of felonies and for murder. 95 These
presumptive sanctions may be substantially modified in the
presence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 96 The judge is
required to impose a definite term of years which may,
however, be modified within 180 days of imposition. 97 Parole is
granted all inmates at the expiration of the court-imposed
sentence, minus applicable good time.9 8 All inmates entering
the penal system begin earning Class I good time, though they
may subsequently be reduced to a slower earning rate as a
result of rule violations. 99 When an inmate violates parole and
is reincarcerated before the expiration of one year, the parole
board then exercises its customary discretion in determining
re-release on parole.' 00
The new legislation in Illinois continues to afford judges
wide sentencing discretion. Though judicial decision making is
constrained to some degree through the provision of statutory
minimums and maximums, judges retain the freedom to
sentence a felon to any term within the legislative range provided. 10 1 In addition to the regular terms authorized for given
crimes, the legislature has made provision for extended terms
where the crime involves "exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty."1 0 2 The extended terms
provide a minimum sentence equal to the regular maximum
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 1252 (1983).
94. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, S 1252 (1983). The judge may sentence a person convicted

of a Class A felony to any term of years not exceeding 20 years.
95. IND. CODE ANN. SS 35-50-2-3 to -2-7 (Burns 1979).

96. IND. CODE ANN. SS 35-50-2-3 to -2-7 (Burns 1979).
97. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-1A-18 (Burns 1979).
98. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-6-1(a) (Burns Supp. 1982).
99. IND. CODE ANN. SS 35-50-6-3(a c) (Burns 1979).
100. IND. CODE ANN. S 35-50-6-1(c) (Burns Supp. 1982).
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 5 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982).

102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 5 1005-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1982). Mitigating factors are set forth in
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-5-3.1 (Smith-Hurd 1982). Aggravating factors are set
forth in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-5-3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
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term, and double that for the extended maximum term. 0 3
Parole under the new law has been redefined as "mandatory
supervised release" and specific terms are specified by the
legislation, based on the class of the offense. 0 4 For murder
and Class X offenses, the mandatory supervised release term
is three years; for Class 1 and Class 2 felonies it is equal to two
years; and for either Class 3 or Class 4 felonies it is set at one
year. 0 5 The Illinois legislation also provides for the impanelling of a sentencing commission which is responsible for promoting uniformity, certainty, and fairness in sentencing
through the development of guidelines and other recommendations.
The presumptive sentencing ranges provided in Colorado's
new legislation present the judge with a reasonably narrow
range of alternatives. The judge must impose a sentence of a
definite term of years, normally within the statutory presumptive range. 0 6 However, Colorado's statutes do allow substantial enhancement or diminution of the penalty where specified
aggravating or mitigating factors are present. 10' 7 Where the
judge sentences outside the prescribed range, he must
specifically articulate his reasons for doing so and the factors
he relied upon.108
Minnesota has taken a different approach in the revision of
its sentencing practices. Rather than follow the lead of other
states in modifying the statutory sentencing ranges available,
Minnesota has enacted guidelines for use by sentencing
judges.' 0 9 The new legislation creates the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, which is responsible for promulgating advisory guidelines for district courts that establish
"(1) The circumstances under which imprisonment of an offender is proper; and (2) A presumptive, fixed sentence for offenders for whom imprisonment is proper, based on each appropriate combination of reasonable offense and offender
characteristics.""10 The commission is specifically directed to
103. ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-2 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
104. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1(d)(Smith-Hurd 1982). See supraTable ' in text accompanying note 83.
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-8-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1982).

106. CoLo. REV. STAT. S 18-1-105(lXb) (Supp. 1982).
107. CoLO. REV. STAT. SS 18-1-105(6) and (9) (Supp. 1982).
108. CoLO. REV. STAT. S 18-1-105(7) (Supp. 1982).

109. MINN. STAT. S 244.09 (Supp. 1983).
110. MINN. STAT. S 244.09(5) (Supp. 1983).
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take into consideration current sentencing and correctional
practices and resources in the creation of sentencing
guidelines. 1 ' The commission is further directed to develop
guidelines which recognize sentencing as a two-stage
process.1 1 2
The sentencing decision may be dissected into essentially
two component parts: 1) the "in/out" decision, and 2) the durational decision."13 The "in/out" decision is the initial determination by the trial court judge as to whether the sentence he
imposes will involve incarceration. If the judge selects confinement of the offender, a second decision, involving the duration
of the confinement, must be addressed. If the trial judge
selects a non-incarcerative disposition, he must then determine
which of the other available sanctions to impose.
Following an extensive research project, which examined
judicial sentencing practices and the releasing practices of the
Minnesota Corrections Board, the commission established
sentencing guidelines based on current practices. The
guidelines developed follow the legislative mandate in
establishing both dispositional and durational presumptive
sentences.

Table 2 presents the sentencing guidelines grid developed
by the guidelines commission. The offenses on the left side of
the matrix are structured according to their severity,11 4 with
Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Possession of Marijuana ranked the least serious, and 2nd Degree Murder as the
most serious.
111. MINN. STAT. S 244.09(5X2) (Supp. 1983).
112. MINN. STAT. S 244.09(5) (Supp. 1983). For a general discussion of sentencing as a bifurcated decision, see L. WILKINS, J.KRESs, D. Go'rrFREDSON, J. CALPIN, & A. GELMAN,
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDUCIAL DISCRETION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
FEASIBILITY STUDY 1-2 (1978).
113. WILKINS, supra note 112, at 1.

114. The offense severity scores were assigned by the commission through a process in which
each commission member sorted cards containing descriptions of the criminal offenses in
the order of their severity. The sorted cards were then aggregated for all commission
members and an aggregate weighting agreed upon by the commission as a whole. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 6-7 (1980).
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Table 2
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines1 15
Presumptive Sentence Lengths in Months
Italicized numbers within the grid denote the range within
which a judge may sentence without the sentence being deemed a departure.
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE
SEVERITY LEVELS OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE
Unauthorized Use of
Motor Vehicle
Posse4sion of Marijuana
Theft Related Cimes
($150-$2500)
Sale of Marijuana

fl

111213

I

12"

12"

12"

15

II

12"

12"

14

17

4

5

6 or
more

18

21

24

20

23

27
25-29

1

-

Theft Crimes ($150-$2500) III

12"

13

16

19

32
27
22
21-23 25-29 30-34

Burglary - Felony Intent
Receving Stolen Goods IV
($15042500)

12"

15

18

21

25
24-26

V

18

23

27

30
29-81

vi

21

26

30

65
54
44
34
83-35 42-46 50-58 60-70

VII

24
23-25

SimpleRobbery

Assault, 2dDegree

AggravatedRobbery
Assault, 1st Degree
CriminalSexual Conduct, Ist Degree

VIII

Murder,3rdDegree
Murder, ndDegree

ix

49
41
32
80-34 38-44 45-53

54
43
41-45 50-58

41
32
30-84 87-45

54
46
38
86-40 43-49 50-58

97
81
65
60-70 75-87 90-104

113
95
76
65
60-70 71-81 89-101 V06-12

132
24-140

230
205
176
149
127
119
97
94-100 116-12 24-180143-155168-1 195-21 18-24

284
324
243
203
162
140
116
X M11-121
188-14 158-171192-214 81-25570-29 _09-38

1st Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law and continues to have a
mandatory life sentence.
*one year and one day
115. This table was taken directly from id. at 38.
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The criminal history score, which frames the top of the
matrix, is based on four factors pertaining to the prior criminal
record of the offender, including 1) prior felony record; 2) the
custody status of the offender at the time of the current offense (e.g., was the offender on probation or parole at the time
the current offense was committed?); 3) prior misdemeanor
record; and 4) the prior juvenile record of young adult
felons. 116 These items are individually scored and then totaled
for an aggregate criminal history score.
In order to determine the sentence recommended by the
guidelines, one needs to find the appropriate cell in which the
conviction offense and criminal history scores intersect. For
example, for an offender who was convicted of simple robbery
and receives a criminal history score of 4, the guidelines
recommend a presumptive sentence of confinement for 38
months. The judge may impose a sentence within the 36 to 40
month range without falling outside the guidelines.
Where compelling mitigating or aggravating factors are
present, the trial judge may sentence outside the presumptive
range.117 Whenever a judge sentences outside of the ranges,
however, he must provide written reasons describing the
mitigating or aggravating factors he relied on. This procedure
is required so that the guidelines can accommodate changing
attitudes regarding the seriousness of offenses and problems
that may exist in the current construction of the guidelines.,,
The heavy black line that intersects the grid is the dispositional line. For cases with combined offense and criminal
history scores that place them in a cell below and to the right of
this dispositional line, the presumption is that the offender will
receive an incarcerative disposition. Similarly, for cases that
fall above and to the left of the dispositional line, the presumption is that the offender will receive a sentence not involving
confinement.
The commission, in establishing its sentencing guidelines,
relied upon both desert and incapacitative penal philos116. Id. at 27.
117. Id. at 30.
118. Id. at 20.
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ophies. 11"9 The seriousness of the offense and the severity of
the offender's prior criminal record play central roles in determining the sentence to be imposed.
The sentencing reform efforts discussed in this section
vary substantially in the approaches they have taken. While
some state legislatures have attempted to restructure penalty
provisions, others have concentrated on guiding the discretion
exercised by sentencing judges within existing statutory
parameters. Each of the states discussed was motivated in the
initiation of their reforms by the desire to enhance the equity
and uniformity of sentencing practices.
CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN WYOMING

The sentencing of convicted adult felons in Wyoming is a
complex task which must take into account the operation of
parole, good time, and executive clemency. Sentencing is not a
single function controlled solely by the trial court judge, but a
process in which the Governorm the Board of Parole, and the
correctional official may, and do, participate in varying
degrees.
The Governor has the power to commute any sentence and
to pardon any offense, with the exceptions of treason and impeachment. 120 With respect to the commutation of sentences,
the Governor generally acts upon the recommendation of the
Board of Parole, who will recommend commutation "only in
rare and exceptional cases." 121 The board includes life
sentences and mandatory minimum sentences which allow no
judicial discretion in sentencing among those "rare and excep122
tional cases."'
The Board of Parole has the power to parole all inmates of
any correctional institution upon the completion of their
minimum sentences, with the exception of those serving life
sentences and those who have committed an assault with a
dangerous weapon upon a correctional official or employee, or
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 9.
WYO. CONST. art. 4, S 5.
Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. VI, S 1 (1974).
Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. VI, S 1 (1974).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 7

620

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

another inmate. 12 3 The board is further charged with the

responsibility of establishing the conditions of parole under
which the parolee must live, the criteria and procedures for the
granting and revocation of parole, and the rules and regulations regarding the granting of good time and special good
time. 124
The Board of Parole is comprised of five members, having
recently been increased from three, who are appointed by the
Governor for six year terms.2

5

Wyoming's parole board is

part-time, as it is in sixteen other states. 126 Members are compensated at the rate of fifty dollars per day for each day of
service.'

27

Rules of the board indicate that all inmates may be paroled
upon service of their minimum sentences provided that the
board is satisfied that the convict will refrain from committing
further crimes; that he has not assaulted anyone in the institution with a deadly weapon, or escaped, or attempted escape;
and that he has agreed to the conditions of parole and has a
reasonable plan for life outside of the facility. 2 8 Precisely what
constitutes service of the minimum sentence becomes an important element in the criminal sentencing process since the
board paroles inmates only upon service of their minimum
sentences.
The Attorney General in a 1974 opinion found that the
board may not grant parole to any inmate who has not served
his minimum sentence. 129 The Attorney General

noted,

however, that the board does have the power to establish a
system of good time and special good time which could operate
123. Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-402(aX1977).
124. Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-402(c) (Supp. 1982).
125. Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-401(b) (Supp. 1982).

126. The parole board is part-time in Alaska, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Utah, and Vermont. The chairman of the board is full-time with the rest of the board parttime in four jurisdictions, i.e., Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and Mississippi. The chairman and two members are full-time with two other members serving part-time in

Nebraska. In all other jurisdictions the board is full-time. ACA Directory of Juvenile and
Adult CorrectionalDep'ts, Institutions,Agencies and ParolingAuths., in SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1980 149 (M. Hindelang, M. Gottfredson & T.

Flanagan eds. 1981).
127. Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-401(d) (Supp. 1982).

128. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. V, S 2 (1974).
129. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 84 (1974).
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to reduce the amount of time an inmate must serve to less than
the judicially imposed minimum sentence:
[T]he granting of "good time" and "special good
time" is a matter resting in the discretionary rulemaking power of the Board. We are unable to find any
statute or other authority which would in any way indicate that the Board is prohibited from devising a good
time formula which would allow the good
time to be
counted against the minimum sentence. 130
Present regulations allow the granting of good time at the
rate of 25 percent off the maximum sentence.' 31 Therefore, on
a twenty-year maximum sentence, the inmate is eligible for
five years of good time. In addition, the inmate may earn additional reductions to his sentence by earning special good
time. 132
' The board, however, has provided that "[g]ood time
allowance[s] shall not be granted or awarded to an inmate so as
to reduce the time served to less than the minimum
1 33
sentence."
The net effect of the parole board's regulations is that an
inmate may not be released prior to complete service of the
minimum judicially imposed sentence. Where an inmate
receives a sentence of, say, 1 to 20 years, he may earn up to
five years of good time and, perhaps, additional special good
time allowances. Assuming no loss of good time, the inmate
must be released upon service of his maximum sentence, less
good time earned. In the case of an inmate with a 19-to-20 year
sentence, however, effectively only one year of good time and
special good time may be earned, and the inmate may not be
released on parole or discharged prior to the expiration of the
19-year minimum sentence.' 34
Good time that has been awarded by the board may also be
revoked or withheld when "an inmate is [found] to have an
130. Id. at 85.
131. Present regulations actually allow the granting of good time at the rate of 10 days at the
end of each month of confinement. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. IV, S 2
(1974). In practice, however, the chart used by the board indicates an equivalent reduction of 25% off of the maximum sentence. Rules and Regs. of the Bd.of Parole, app. 1B
(1974).
132. Rules and Regs. of the Bd.of Parole, Ch. IV, S 3 (1974).
133. Rules and Regs. of the Bd.of Parole, Ch. IV, S 1 (1974).
134. The inmate would have to serve the full 19-year minimum sentence assuming there is no
sentence change authorized by the sentencing court and no commutation authorized b
21.

of theof
judicially
imposed
sentence.1983
See supra note
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attitude, conduct and/or behavior which is not good, proper
and/or helpful and/or not to have adhered to the rules of the institution."' 135 Before good time may be revoked the inmate
must be given a hearing; this policy accords with the requirement of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wolffv.
McDonnell.136 There exists in the provisions of the Board of
Parole, however, no limitation on the amount of good time that
may be withheld or revoked from an inmate for any particular
infraction. 137 Good time that has been forfeited may, at the
discretion of the board, be restored in whole or in part. 3 8
The ambiguity of the standard authorizing good time
forfeiture where an inmate has an "attitude conduct and/or
behavior which is not good, proper and/or helpful" grants the
correctional official and the parole board extraordinary power.
Correctional and parole authorities thus have powers which
are tantamount to those of a sentencing judge in punishing in139
stitutional infractions.
The power of the Governor to commute judicially imposed
sentences and the parole board's decisions regarding parole
release and good time credits have a substantial impact on the
entire criminal sentencing process. The sentence actually imposed by the trial judge, particularly the minimum sentence, is,
of course, still the most important factor in criminal
sentencing.
District court judges throughout Wyoming frequently find
themselves confronted with the demanding task of sentencing
135. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. IV, S 4 (1974).
136. 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Specifically, the board provides the inmate with 1) written
notice of the alleged violation; 2) opportunity for a hearing within five days of the alleged
violation; 3) opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses; 4)
opportunity to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf; 5) a hearing examiner
who was not involved in the incident leading to the violation; and 6) written findings of
fact. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. IV, SS 3-4 (1974).
137. Good time does not vest in Wyoming. Inmates may lose all or any part of the amount of
good time they have earned for violation of specified institutional rules. See BOARD OF
CHARITIES AND REFORM, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY INMATE RULES HANDBOOK
Ch.31, S 7 (1982). Some jurisdictions allow good time to vest or restrict the amount of
good time which may be lost for a single infraction. See supra Table 1 and text accompanying notes 70-108.
138. Rules and Regs. of the Bd. of Parole, Ch. IV, S 6 (1974).
139. Given the ability of the board to revoke all or any part of an inmate's good time, this may
amount to several years in cases where the offender has received a lengthy maximum
term. The board may choose to "flatten-out" an inmate for an infraction, in which case
the inmate would forfeit all good time earned or available to be earned. In the case of an
inmate with a sentence of one to 20 years, this would amount to a loss of five years good
time.
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the convicted felon. Judges have consistently acknowledged
that sentencing is the most burdensome responsibility they
routinely face. 140 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more
awesome challenge than that facing the official charged with
determining the fate of a fellow human. The extraordinary
power possessed by the sentencing judge must be exercised, at
least in Wyoming, with virtually no legislative guidance and
with substantially free and unfettered discretion. District
courts are merely directed that they
[s]hall not fix a definite term of imprisonment, but
shall establish a maximum and minimum term for which
said convict shall be held in said prison. The maximum
term shall not be longer than the longest term fixed by
law for the punishment of the offense of which he was
convicted, and the minimum term shall be not less than
the shortest term fixed by law for the punishment of the
offense of which he was convicted.'
While judges are specifically directed not to impose a
sentence of a definite term of years, the statutes explicitly pro142
vide that such a sentence "shall not for that reason be void.'
Beyond these dubious parameters judges are free to devise any
conceivable range of sentence, provided that its aggregate
term does not exceed the generous provisions of the law.
Wyoming departs from national standards and from the
trend in a great many states which favor the creation of broad
legislative classes of offenses, ordered by the seriousness of
the crime and the severity of the penalty assigned. 143 The
criminal code of Wyoming attaches a separate penalty provision to each of the criminal offenses defined by statute. A
classification of offenses by their statutory penalty ranges appears to produce 19 separate classes of offenses. 4 4
140. Meeting of the CriminalCodeSubcomm. of the JointJudiciaryInterimComm., Wyoming
State Legislature (June 20, 1981) (comments of Wyoming District Court Judge Joseph F.
Maier).
"141. WYo. STAT. S 7-13-201 (1977).
142. Wyo. STAT. S 7-13-202 (1977).
143. See MODEL PENAL CODE S6.01 (1962); ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES,

supranote 15, Standard 2.1(a) (Approved Draft 1968).
144. Examples of these 19 different sentences are: WYo. STAT. S6-4-101 (1977) (murder in the
first degree-under certain circumstances, death); S 6-1-110 (1977) (habitual criminal [4
convictions of felony]-life); S 6-4-104 (1977) (murder in the second degree-20 years to
life); S 6-4-306(cXi) (1977) Sexual assault in the first or second degree, extended-five
years to life); S 6-1-109 (1977) (habitual criminal [3 convictions of felony]-10 years to 50
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The discretion allowed sentencing judges by Wyoming
statutes is not significantly limited by case law. Although the
Wyoming Supreme Court has recently recommended that trial
judges provide some discussion of the factors relied upon in
sentencing, this recommendation fails to rise to the level of a
mandate. 145 Provided the sentence imposed does not exceed

the maximum ranges allowed by law, the district judge has
consistently been assured that his discretion will not be abridged or constrained by the appellate court in any manner.
Present Wyoming law places no limitations and provides
no guidance to the trial judge in the imposition of a minimum
sentence. Although the American Bar Association recommends limiting the length of the minimum sentence to not
more than one-third of the maximum sentence imposed, 146 no
such limitation presently exists in Wyoming. Indeed, the inviolability of the trial court's sentencing discretion has been
reaffirmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in two recent
cases.
In Scheikofsky v. State 47 the defendant appealed from a

10-to-15-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter, alleging
that the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing the
defendant to so lengthy a term. A sentence of not more than 20
years is authorized by statute for manslaughter. 148 The Wyoming Supreme Court, apparently noting the leniency of the trial
judge in "sentenc[ing] appellant to a minimum term of ten

145.

146.
147.
148.

years); S 6-4-402 (1977) (aggravated robbery-five years to 50 years); S 6-7-305 (1977)
(Embezzlement of public funds-not more than 21 years); S 6-7-101 (1977) (arson, first
degree-two years to 20 years); S 6-4-306(aXii) (1977) (sexual assault in the second
degree-one year to 20 years); S 6-2-102 (1977) (forging public securities-one year to 15
years); S 6-7-201 (1977) (burglary-not more than 14 years); S 6-8-710 (1977) (bringing
weapons or explosives into prison-three years to ten years); S 6-4-306(cXii) (1977) (sexual
assault in the third degree, extended-two years to ten years); S 6-7-301 (1977) (grand
larceny-not more than ten years); S 6-8-302 (1977) (escape or attempt to escape by
violence-not more than 10 years); S 6-5-202 (1977) (mutilation of dead human
bodies-two years to five years); S 6-7-601 (1977) (blackmailing-not more than five
years); S 6-8-501 (1977) (false jurat-not more than three years); S 6-1-115 (1977) (accessory after the fact-not more than two years).
Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1982). Several standards presently recommend a
statement by the sentencing judge as to the factors relied upon and the reasoning
underlying the sentence imposed. See MODEL PENAL CODE S 10 (1962); ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, Standard 5.6 (Approved Draft
1968). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 1005-4-1(c) (Smith-Hurd 1982).
ABA STANDARDS-SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 15, Standard 3.2(cXiii) (Approved Draft 1968). See also MODEL PENAL CODE S 6.06 (1962) (mandates that the
minimum sentence shall not be more than one-half of the maximum sentence imposed).
636 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1981).
Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-107 (Supp. 1982).
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years-half the time allowed by statute" 149 stated, "If a trial
court's determination of the terms of imprisonment is within
the statutory limits, it will not be disturbed absent a clear
abuse of discretion. 1 50 Chief Justice Rose, reluctantly concurring with the court's decision regarding the sentencing issue,
excoriated the court's self-imposed "hands-off doctrine" and
the failure of the court to establish viable standards for appellate review of sentencing:
[T]he majority opinion relies upon this court's timehonored principle which says that if a sentence falls
within the statutory limits, it will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. . . Ergo, since appellant's sentence fell within the statutory limits, it was
automatically upheld. In view of the fact that we have
never adopted sentencing standards, the end result is
that there is no possibility for this court to find an abuse
of discretion where the trial judge's sentence is within
statutory parameters. 151
In Daniel v. State,152 the court once again affirmed the
trial judge's discretion in sentencing the defendant, this time
to 19-to-20 years for involuntary manslaughter. The court ignored data presented by both the defendant and the state that
indicated that the defendant received a minimum sentence" 12
years longer than any minimum sentence imposed for involuntary manslaughter in any recent case in Wyoming."'1 53 Reasoning that "[W]ere we to require uniformity in sentencing and be
guided by statistics, we would, in effect, mandate sentencing
by computer,' ' 54 the court again refused to find an abuse of
judicial discretion, and noted that the sentence imposed was
within the statutory range-thereby meeting the sole criterion
of constitutionality mandated by the court. Again Chief Justice
Rose felt compelled to concur in the sentencing aspect of the
decision, though he lamented the lack of standards for ap55
pellate review of sentences.'
149. 636 P.2d at 1112.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1115 (Rose, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
152. 644 P.2d 172, 180 (Wyo. 1982).
153. Id. at 188 (Rose, C.J., specially concurring).
154. Id. at 180.
155. Id. at 188 (Rose, C.J., specially concurring).
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In order to assess current sentencing practices in Wyoming, data have been extracted from the Offender Demographic/Status Data System (ODDS), a correctional management information system jointly designed by the Division of
Criminal Identification of the Attorney General's Office and
the Board of Charities and Reform. 156 The ODDS system was
designed to provide both management information for the proper administration of correctional agencies throughout the
state, and to establish a firm research and criminal history
data base. The ODDS system was implemented July 1, 1980,
and currently maintains data in all persons who were residents
in one of the correctional facilities on that date, or who have
been sentenced to one of the institutions since then.
Table 3 presents data regarding statutory sentence
authorizations and average sentences imposed by Wyoming
District Court Judges for a sample of adult felons confined in
either the Wyoming State Penitentiary or the Wyoming
Women's Center. 157 The Severity Ranking is a variable

calculated by the author and is based on the maximum
sentence authorized for the offense by current Wyoming
statutes. 158
156. The ODDS system is an automated management information system currently operated
on a daily basis by the Center for Criminal Justice Research, Division of Criminal Identification, Wyoming Attorney General's Office.
157. All adult inmates for whom the Division of Criminal Identification had accurate and
error-free data were included in the sample. The sample includes data on adults who were
confined in either the Wyoming State Penitentiary or the Women's Center between July
1, 1980 and June 1, 1982. The data are sentence-based rather than offender-based, which
means that a separate record was recorded for each sentence imposed on an offender in
confinement. The majority of offenders for whom data was analyzed had only one offense
and sentence. A small number of offenders, however, were convicted of more than one offense and received multiple sentences. For these offenders, a separate record was recorded for each offense and sentence for which they were confined.
158. The Severity Rank, which was calculated by the author, is based on the maximum
sentence available under current Wyoming statutes. The coding scheme is as follows:
Severity Rank
Maximum Sentence Authorized
[None]
Death
[None]
Life
25
50 years
10.5
21 years
10
20 years
7
14 years
10 years
5
2.5
5 years
1.5
3 years
1
2 years
Offenses with maximum authorized sentences of either death or life were not assigned a
severity rank since they cannot assume a numeric value relative to the specific term or
years imposed for the other offenses.
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Table 3
Sentences Authorized by Wyoming Statutes
and
Average Sentences Imposed

Offense

Habitual Offender
(3 Convictions)
Habitual Offender
(4 Convictions)
Accessory After
The Fact
Criminal Conspiracy
Forgery
Obtain Money by
False Pretenses
Fraudulent Checks
Fraud by Checks
1st Degree Murder
2nd Degree Murder

Manslaughter
Kidnap for Ransom
Child Stealing or
Harboring
Involuntary Transfer
of Custody of Child
Involuntary Transfer
of Custody of Child:
Abduct for Profit
1st Degree
Sexual Assault

Statute
Citation

Sentence Authorized"'
by Wyoming Statutes
Minimum
Maximum

Sentence Imposed'
Average Average
Minimum Maximum

No. of
Cases

6-1-109

120

600

120.0

293.3

9

6-1-110

Life

Life

Life

Life

1

6-1-115
6-1-117
6-2-101

-0.162

24
120
168

15.3
39.9
26.7

24.0
66.6
52.8

4
20
115

120
25.4
-06-3-106
18.4
6-3-113
-060
36
18.8
6-3-124
-06-4-101 Death/Life De ath/Life Death
Life
Life
Life
6-4-104 240/Life
360.0
240.0
247.1
240
82.6
6-4-107
-0)eath/
82.6
6-4-201 Death/02401"

47.9
42.0
31.6
Death
Life
Life
Life
Life
396.7
159.5
140.7

37
20
8
1
65
8
1
1
17
46
9

6-4-202

12

Life

240.0

360.0

1

6-4-204

-0-

24

12.0

18.0

1

6-4-205

-0-

120

60.0

84.0

1

-0-0-

Severity'"
Rank

5

3
Life
Life
.161
2
Life
420.0
25
53
113.3 223.9
159. Both the sentences authorized by Wyoming statutes and those imposed are presented in
months.
160. See supra note 158.
161. No severity rank assigned since the maximum authorized sentence is life. See supranote
158.
162. While the statutes provide that no one shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for less than one (1) year (WYo. STAT. S 6-1-106 (1977)), the offenses with a
designated minimum of "-0-' authorize a sentence of "not more than" the maximum
sentence provided.
163. No severity rank assigned since the maximum authorized sentence is death. See supra
note 158.
164. The penalty provided in statute for this offense authorizes the jury to impose a sentence
of death. If the death sentence is not imposed or does not apply (where the kidnapped victim has been released unharmed prior to the commencement of the trial) "the convicted
person shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a period of not
more than twenty (20) years." WYO. STAT. S 6-4-201 (1977).
165. The sentence authorized by statute for first degree sexual assault is "imprisonment for
not less than five (5) years nor more than fifty (50) years." WYO. STAT. S 6-4-306(aXi)
(1977). The statutes also provide for extended sentencing where the offender is being
6-4-302

60/60

16

600/Life
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Offense

2nd Degree
Sexual Assault
3rd Degree
Sexual Assault
Attempted Sexual
Assault
Robbery Generally
Aggravated Robbery
Assault & Battery
with Felonious Intent
Child Abuse: Person
Under 16 Years
of Age
Aggravated Assault
Kill Unborn Child
1st Degree Arson
2nd Degree Arson
3rd Degree Arson
4th Degree Arson
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Unlawful Conversion
by Bailee
Receiving Stolen
Goods
Embezzlement of
Public Funds
Embezzlement by
Employees
Embezzlement by
Innkeeper or Bailee
Fraudulent Procurement of Food or Accommodations
Dispose of Mortgaged
Property with Intent
to Deprive

Vol. XVIII

LAND & WATER LAW REVIEW
Statute
Citation

Sentence Authorized"'
by Wyoming Statutes
Minimum
Maximum

s

Sentence Imposed' *
Average Average
Minimum Maximum

No. of
Cases

Severity'"
Rank

6-4-303

12/60

240/Life ' 6e

47.0

81.5

10

6-4-304

12/24

60/12067

19.4

40.6

2.5

6-4-314
6-4-401
6-4-402

12
-060

60
168
600

30.0
28.0
85.4

60.0
54.8
156.7

2.5
7
25

6-4-503

-0-

168

72.4

114.7

7

6-4-504
6-4-506
6-4-507
6-7-101
6-7-102
6-7-103
6-7-104
6-7-201

-0-0-024
12
12
12
-0-460

22.7
60
45.8
168
168
144.0
24.0
240
120
29.4
36
18.0
24
16.0
168/600168 90.0

2.5
7
7
10

6-7-301

-0-

120

32.3
26.4

47.0
89.5
168.0
60.0
68.6
36.0
24.0
230.0
64.3

6-7-303

-0-

120

21.5

6-7-304

-0-

120

37.4

74.7

5

6-7-305

-0-

252

18.2

37.6

10.5

6-7-310

-0-

168

14.5

42.0

7

6-7-311

-0-

168

16.0

56.0

7

6-7-502

12

60

18.0

30.0

5

1.5
1
25169
7
5

53.9

44.4

5

2

2.5

6-7-603
-0120
32.0
80.0
3
5
sentenced for two or more acts of first or second degree sexual assault, or has previously
been convicted of a crime which contains the same or similar elements. Wyo. STAT. SS
6-4-306(bXi) to -(ii) (1977). The extended sentence for first degree sexual assault is "imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more than life." Wyo. STAT. S6-4-306(cXi)
(1977).
166. The sentence authorized by statute for second degree sexual assault is "imprisonment for
not less than one (1) year nor more than twenty (20) years." WYo. STAT. S 6-4-306(aXii)

(1977). The extended sentence for second degree sexual assault is the same as that provided for first degree sexual assault. See supra note 165.
167. The sentence authorized for third degree sexual assault is "imprisonment for not less
than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years." Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-306(aXiii) (1977). The
extended sentence for third degree sexual assault is "imprisonment for not less than two
(2) years nor more than ten (10) years." Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-306(cXii) (1977).
168. The sentence authorized for burglary is imprisonment for not more than 14 years. Wyo.
STAT. S 6-7-201(a) (1977). Extended sentencing is also provided where one of the following four factors are present: 1) The offender was armed with a dangerous weapon; 2) the
offender armed himself with a dangerous weapon while in the burglarized enclosure; 3)
the offender used an explosive to open the depository; or 4) the offender committed a battery upon a person while in the burglarized enclosure. WYO. STAT. S 6-7-201(b) (1977).
The sentence for burglary, where any one of these factors is present, is imprisonment for
"not less than five (5) years nor more than fifty (50) years." Wyo. STAT. S 6-7-201(b)
(1977).
169. For purposes of analysis, burglary sentences with a maximum sentence greater than 14
years were assigned a severity ranking of 25.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/7

38

Roberts: The Changing Structure of Criminal Sentencing

1983
Offense

629

CRIMINAL SENTENCING

Statute
Citation

Escaping from County
Jail
6-8-301
Escape by Violence or
6-8-302
While Armed
Aid or Abet Escape:
Person Charged/Convicted of Felony
6-8-304
Escape from Penal
Institution
6-8-305
Willful Injury to
6-10-105
Property
Possession of
Firearms
6-11-101
Possession of Weapon
by Person Convicted
6-11-115
of Crime of Violence
Killing Livestock
of Another
11-30-101
Butchering Stolen
Animals
11-30-103
Immoral or Indecent
Acts
14-3-105
20-3-101
Desertion: Generally
Unauthorized Use of
Automobile (Auto
Theft)
31-11-102
Sale of Stolen
Automobiles or Parts 31-11-103
Theft of Parts of
Value More than
$20.00
31-11-104
Deface Motor
31-11-108
Numbers

Sentence Authorized"'
by Wyoming Statutes
Minimum
Maximum

Sentence Imposed'"
Average Average
Minimum Maximum

No. of
Cases

17.9

30.0

10

50.7

80.7

11

Severity'O
Rank

-0-

168

23.4

62.3

7

7

12

120

25.6

54.4

15

5

12

60

21.0

43.5

8

2.5

-0-

60

28.5

54.0

4

2.5

-0-

60

28.6

40.8

5

2.5

12

60

18.0

60.0

3

2.5

18.0

42.0

2

52.3
18.0

84.0
36.0

7
1

12

120

23.0

52.8

93

12

120

18.0

36.0

2

12

120

15.0

36.0

2

12

120

24.0

60.0

1

The severity ranking can be useful in comparing sentences
imposed for offenses that share the same statutory penalty
provision. For example, for severity level 7, which includes offenses with a maximum penalty range of not more than fourteen years, the following sentencing practices are observed:
Table 4
Offense
Forgery
Robbery: Generally
Burglary
Aggravated Assault
Assault & Battery with
Felonious Intent

Sentences Imposed170
Average
Average

No. of

Minimum

Maximum

Cases

26.7
28.0
32.3
45.8

52.8
54.8
64.3
89.5

115
45
302
76

72.4

114.7

18171

170. Average minimum and maximum sentences imposed are presented in months.
171. The value of the average becomes less stable when the number of cases is small.
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Although the statutory sentencing limit for each of the
above offenses is identical-not more than fourteen years-it is
apparent that judges distinguish between the offenses and
sentence accordingly. Lacking guidance in the assignment of
specific penalties within broad legislative categories, judges
are forced to assume the task of ranking offenses within penalty ranges and to sentence according to their own perceptions
of the severity of the offenses. Such practices provide fertile
ground for the seeds of disparate decision making.
A related analysis compares sentencing practices across
levels of severity. Table 5 presents data comparing the judicially imposed sentences for a sample of offenses, each of which
has a different sentence authorized by statute.
Table 5
Sentences Imposed'12
Average
Average

Offense
No Account Checks
Unauthorized Use of
Automobile (Auto
Theft)
Burglary
Manslaughter
Aggravated Robbery

Minimum

Maximum

18.4

42.0

23.0
32.3
82.6
85.4

52.8
64.3
159.5
156.7

Severity' 73

No. of

Ranking

Cases

2.5
5
7
10
25

20
93
302
46
69

For no-account checks, auto theft, and burglary a
reasonable progression in the severity of sentences imposed is
both expected and observed, given the climbing severity ranking of each of the offenses. The average sentences imposed for
manslaughter and aggravated robbery, however, are notable
for their similarity despite the substantial differences in the
sentences authorized for those crimes. The sentence authorized for manslaughter is not more than 20 years, 17 4 while the
sentence authorized for aggravated robbery is 5-to-50 years
imprisonment. 17 5 The fact that the average sentence imposed
for aggravated robbery so closely approximates that imposed
for manslaughter perhaps indicates that in practice judges
perceive little difference in the severity of the two offenses.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Average minimum and maximum sentences imposed are presented in months.
For a discussion of the Severity Rank and how it was calculated, see supra note 158.
Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-107 (Supp. 1982).
Wyo. STAT. S 6-4-402 (1977).
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This would seem to indicate that the legislative ranking of the
severity of offenses, in terms of the sentence authorized, is
modified in practice by the sentencing judge.
The legislature has created broad and overlapping penalty
ranges for offenses, leaving the task of distinguishing the
seriousness of offenses to the sentencing judge. Sentencing
judges sanction offenses according to their perceived
seriousness, both within and across levels of legislative severity. Questions challenging the equity of decision making must
surface where the sentencing system is so broadly constructed
and rife with discretion.
In order to assess the extent to which sentencing disparity
exists in Wyoming, Table 6 presents the average sentences imposed by severity rank for each of Wyoming's nine judicial
districts.
Table 6
Average Sentences Imposed
by Judicial District
176
Within Offense Severity Ranks
StateDist A Dist B Dist C Dist D Dist E Dist F Dist G Dist H Dist I wide

Severity Rank 1
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

16.3 12.0 12.0
24.0 24.0 18.0
1
1
3

Severity Rank 1.5
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

12.0 26.5 13.0 16.5 36.0 24.0 18.0 12.0 18.0 17.7
12.0 36.0 28.0 24.3 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 36.0 29.8
2
19
1
1
1
4
1
6
1
2

Severity Rank 2.5
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

15.0 22.0 26.9 15.9 42.0 27.4 13.5 19.7 30.0 23.6
36.0 44.0 45.6 36.1 81.0 53.3 38.0 54.0 51.0 48.1
4
65
2
7
9
14
6
10
4
9

Severity Rank 5
25.6
Average Minimum
66.3
Average Maximum
38
Number of Cases
176. The average minimum and

16.0
24.0
1

28.9 27.5 27.1 22.3 33.8 29.1 27.1
55.4 49.3 47.2 48.5 61.1 60.3 64.7
38
36
24
23
52
43
54
maximum sentences imposed are presented

14.8
23.0
6

27.1 27.4
53.6 55.8
21 319
in months.

Judicial Districts A through I are labels randomly assigned to Wyoming Judicial Districts
1 through 9. For a discussion of the Severity Rank, see supra note 158.
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StateDist A Dist B Dist C Dist D Dist E Dist F Dist G Dist H Dist I wide

Severity Rank 7
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

21.7 36.2 33.5 28.6 26.1 37.4 35.8 31.5 40.0 32.7
61.3 66.6 58.6 50.2 57.2 73.2 69.6 76.7 67.3 64.7
72
49 121
29
55 102
47
43
57 575

Severity Rank 10
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

39.0 66.3 93.0 63.0 71.3194.3 74.0 70.3
90.0 134.2 169.5 141.0 126.0 240.0 142.7 149.1
8
19
4
4
6
3
9
7

Severity Rank 10.5
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases
Severity Rank 25
Average Minimum
Average Maximum
Number of Cases

36.0 24.0
48.0 36.0
1
1

20.0
48.0
3

14.0 12.0
28.5 36.0
2
2

72.7
138.6
60
18.2
37.6
11

77.7 143.1 71.5 76.8 81.2 120.0 98.4 125.1 113.0 97.4
153.5 216.9 209.7 162.0 125.5 214.8 164.0 250.3 195.0 187.8
20
13
23
10
13
10
15
14
12 130

While several of the severity ranks contain too few cases for
accurate comparisons, ranks 5, 7 and 25 each contain a sufficient number of cases for review. For severity rank 5 the
average minimum sentences imposed vary from 22.3 months

for District E to 33.8 months for District F. Even larger variations are noted for the average maximum sentences, which
range from 47.2 months in District D to 66.3 months in District

A.
Similar and larger variations are noted for both levels 7

and 25. At rank 7, which includes offenses with a maximum
penalty range of 14 years, average minimum sentences imposed range from 21.7 months for District A to 37.4 months for
District F. Average maximum sentences at this level indicate a
low of 50.2 months in District D and a high of 76.7 months in

District H.
The range of sentences judicially imposed is even more ap-

parent for severity rank 25, where average minimum
sentences vary from 71.5 months for District C, to twice that,
or 143.1 months in District B. Similarly, average maximum
sentences observed range from a low of 125.5 months in

District E, to nearly double that, or 250.3 months in District H.
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While these data would seem to indicate that sentencing
disparity in fact does exist in Wyoming, a host of other
variables that are typically relied upon by sentencing judges
have not yet been taken into account. For example, the
number of prior felony convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, and the number of offenses involved in the conviction are factors that may account for some of the variation
that has been observed among the judicial districts. A more
sophisticated analysis would require that the effects of these
factors be controlled for when looking at sentencing variation
across districts.
A sophisticated and generally accepted statistical procedure, known as multiple regression, was utilized in an
analysis of our sample to assess sentencing practices across
judicial districts.1 77 This procedure allows the researcher to address the question, "Does knowing the judicial district from
which an offender was sentenced significantly increase our
ability to predict the length of sentence the offender
received?"
Because of the small number of cases in all severity ranks
but 5 and 7, only those rankings were individually analyzed.
With the exception of minimum sentences imposed for
on is a statistical technique frequently used in the social sciences to
177. Multiple rer
measure relationships between variables and to predict one variable from the knowledge
of several variables. See generally H. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS, 381-552 (rev. 2d
ed. 1979);, G. GLASS & J. STANLEY, STATISTICAL METHODS IN EDUCATION AND
PSYCHOLOGY 133-94 (1970). For the purpose of analyzing sentencing variation across
judicial districts, the minimum and maximum sentences dicially-imposed were treated
as the dependent variables, Le., they were the variables we wished to predict. The
number of prior convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, and the number of offenses the offender was convicted of for his present incarceration were the independent
variables from which the minimum and maximum sentences were predicted.

In assessing the impact of judicial decisioninaldg on sentencing, and particularly

when addressing the issue of sentencing disparity, it is also important to enter either the
judge or the Judicial district as an independent variable in the multiple regression equation. The coding of this variable, however, is nominal, meaning that the number assigned
in the coding of the variable has no intrinsic value except to identify the decisionmaker. In
order to correct this methodological problem, statistical techniques allow the creation of
dummy variables to account for the specific judicial districts. See BLALOCK, supra at
534-38; N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, & D. BENT, STATISTICAL
PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 373-82 (2d ed. 1975)
The dummy variables which were created were D1 through D8, which correspond to
judicial districts A through H. The coding of each of the dummy variables was
dichotomous, equaling 1 or 0. If an individual were sentenced by ajudge located in judicial
district A, dummy variable D1 was coded to equal 1. If the offender was sentenced by a
judge from some other district, dummy variable D1 was coded 0. Similarly, for those persons who were sentenced from district B, dummy variable D2 was coded 1. For all other
people in the data set, D2 was coded 0. This is the process used in the coding of each of the
dummy variables D1 through D8.
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offenses at severity level 5, the data indicate that knowing the
judicial district from which an offender was sentenced does indeed significantly increase one's ability to predict the sentence
imposed. The data indicate that an offender's prior felony conviction record, his prior incarceration history, and the number
of offenses involved on the conviction account for between
11.5 percent and 26.5 percent of the variation in sentences imposed by district judges. 178 When we add the knowledge of
178. The tables below present the result of four serrate multiple regression analyses.
TableF
SEVERITY RANK 7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MINIMUM SENTENCE
Independent Variable
V3 No. of Convictions
V4 No. of Incarcerations
V8 No. Offenses of Conviction
DI-D8 Dummy Judicial Districts

Simple r

Multiple r

R Square

.26260
.31670
.08235

.26260
.31670
.34001
.37551

.06896
.10030
.11561
.14101

R Square Sigificanceof

Chae

.03134
.01531
.02540

ge

RS

p<.001
p<.01
p<.01

SEVERITY RANK 7
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MAXIMUM SENTENCE
Independent Variable
V3 No. of Convictions
V4 No. of Incarcerations
V8 No. Offenses of Conviction
D1-D8 Dummy Judicial Districts

Simple r
.31129
.36896
.02154

Multiple r
.31129
.37898
.38533
.43057

R Square
.09690
.14363
.14848
.18539

R Square
Change

Significance of
R SqneaGe

.04673
.00485
.03691

p<.001
N.S.
p<.01

SEVERITY RANK 5
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MINIMUM SENTENCE
Independent Variable
V3 No. of Convictions
V4 No. of Incarcerations
V8 No. Offenses of Conviction
D1-D8 Dmy Judicial
Districts

Simple r
.30068
.32808
.41038

Multiple r
.30068
.32927
.51524
.53507

R Square
.09041
.10842
.26547
.2830

nR Sqae
Che

Significanceof
R S= C;

.01801
.15705
.02083

p<.05
p<.00l
N.S.

SEVERITY RANK 5

DEPENDENT VARIABLE = MINIMUM SENTENCE
Independent Variable
V3 No. of Convictions
V4 No. of Incarcerations
V8 No. Offenses of Conviction
D1-D8 Dummy Judicial Districts

Simple r
.35692
.40808
.33249

Multiple r
.35692
.40808
.51517
.55970

R Square
.12739
.16653
.26540
.31326

RCqur
C
.03914
.09887
.05786

Significance of
Sanae Ceof
p<.001
p<.001
p<.01

The "Simple R" is a measure of the simple correlation between the dependent variable
and each of the independent variables. The correlation coefficient varies from - 1.00 to 0
to + 1.00. This statistic measures the strength and direction of a relationship. Where the
statistic equals 0, or very close to it, one may conclude that the two variables being
measured are unrelated, i.e., each operates independently of the other. As the value of
the coefficient approaches 1.00 (either positive or negative) the conclusion may be drawii
that the variables under study are strongly related. Where the value of the coefficient is
positive, this indicates that as the value of one variable (X) increases, so does the value of
the other variable (Y). A negative correlation would indicate that as the value of one
variable (X) increases, the value of the other variable (Y) decreases.
"Multiple R," in the above table, is the same statistic calculated to assess the aggregate relationship between a dependent variable and several independent variables. "R
quare" is simply the square of the multiple r value. The "R Square value may be interpreted as the proportion of variance in the dependent variable which is explained by
ow ledge of the independent variables. For example, in the above table, for severity
rank 7 with the minimum sentence as the dependent variable, "R Square" is equal to
.06896when the variable "No. of Convictions" is entered into the equation. This value indicates that knowing the number of convictions an offender has, when the offender has
been convicted of an offense of severity rank 7, would explain nearly 7% of the variation
in the minimum sentence imposed (precisely, it would explain 6.896%). When we know
both the number of prior convictions and incarcerations an offender has, we can explain a
total of 10% (10.030) of the variation in minimum sentences.
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which judicial district the offender was sentenced in, we can
explain an additional amount of variation in sentences imposed, ranging from 2.1 percent to 5.8 percent.
While knowledge of the judicial district an offender was
sentenced in explains a statistically significant amount of
sentencing variation, it is important to note that the
magnitude of variation is not extraordinarily large. What this
means is that, while the district makes a statistically significant difference in the sentences meted out to offenders, the
differences do not appear to be exceedingly broad.
Nevertheless, the presence of sentencing disparity must be
a concern to all who value equity in the treatment of offenders.
That the sentence an offender receives will be determined in
part by the judicial district in which he is sentenced is an indication of our failure to construct a just and equitable system
of criminal punishment.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The data presented in this paper indicate that sentencing
disparity does exist in Wyoming. 1'7 9 While reasonable controls
were utilized in the analysis, further research is needed to take
into consideration factors not included in this study. The
severity of injury in person-to-person crimes and the dollar
amount of property loss or damage in property crimes are two
variables not included in this research that may have a
substantial impact on sentencing decisions. Similarly, the
defendant's plea and the relationship between the victim and
the offender may play important roles in explaining variation
in the sentences imposed. 180
The "R Square Change" value allows us to examine the contribution of a subset of
variables to the total amount of variation explained. This is the substance of the statistical
test which indicates that knowledge of judicial district significantly increases the amount
of variation explained in sentences imposed. The "R Square Change" value for the same
example above indicates that knowledge of the offender's prior incarceration hsitory explains an additional 3.134% of the variation in the minimum sentence imposed, above and
beyond the 6.896% explained by knowing the number of prior felony convictions.
The "Significance of R Square Change" indicates whether the "R Square Change"
increase for knowledge of a particular variable is statistically significant. The notation
"N.S." indicates that knowledge of the applicable variable does not significantly contribute to the total amount of variation explained in the sentences imposed.
179. For a similar view on sentencing in Wyoming, see generally Morgan, supra note 15, at
534-38.
180. Britt and Larnitz, The Effects of Plea Bargainingon the Dispositionof Personand Property Crimes:A Research Note, in INDICATORS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: QUAN-
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The findings that indicate that there is unexplained variation in sentencing practices between judicial districts
throughout Wyoming portend inequitable treatment of offenders. While some have argued that district court judges
should reflect community standards in sentencing,18 1 significant questions must surface where the length of sentence an
individual receives is based on the geographic location of the
sentencing court.
That sentencing disparity exists in Wyoming testifies to
the need for broad-based criminal justice reforms. As has been
observed, sentencing is not simply the lonely and awesome
responsibility of the district court judge. It is, instead, a process in which the responsibility is shared with the legislature,
the Governor, prison officials, and the Boards of Parole and
Charities and Reform. Any attempt at reform must recognize
the interplay between these agencies and actors.
Before any substantive reforms can responsibly take place,
however, a point of reference-a statement of the principles
which will guide the system of criminal punishment-is required. Such a statement will lend coherence both to reform efforts and to the daily operation of the penal system.
RECOMMENDATION 1: The legislature should enact a comprehensive statement articulatingthe goals and objectives of
our penal system.
Wyoming statutes presently offer little guidance to the
sentencing judge in selecting a proper sanction for the convicted adult felon. It is imperative that the legislature provide
a comprehensive and articulate statement of a philosophical
framework to guide and direct the exercise of the state's
punitive powers. The lack of adequate guidelines substantially
increases the complexity of the task facing the sentencing
titative Studies 70-73 (S. Fienberg & A. Reiss, Jr. eds. 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, L.
SUTTON, PREDICTING SENTENCES IN FEDERAL COURTS: THE FEASIBILITY OF A NATIONAL SENTENCING POLICY, ANALYTIC REP. 19 (1978). See generally sources cited
supra note 15.

181. Meeting of the Criminal Code Subcomm., Joint Judiciary Interim Comm., Wyoming
State Legislature (Aug. 1, 1980) (conments of Wyoming State Sen. David R. Nicholas).
But see HOGARTH, supra note 15, at 200, whose findings indicate that magistrates selectively perceive public opinion in ways which maximize consistency with their own beliefs:
"[N]on-punitive magistrates tend to view the social influences in their environment as being supportive of a non-punitive sentencing policy. The reverse is true for punitive
magistrates, and this held true for each area examined."
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judge and cultivates fertile soil for the seeds of sentencing
disparity.
The current sentencing statutes in Wyoming vest broad
discretionary authority in the district court judges, without
substantial guidance or review from either the legislature or
the Wyoming Supreme Court. A system which is charged with
such consequential decisionmaking power, yet burdened with
so little formal structure, produces inequitable treatment
almost by design.
Wyoming can take one of several paths charted in recent
years across the landscape of sentencing reform. Essentially,
those reform efforts can be distilled into two distinct approaches. Under the first approach, the legislature undertakes
to rewrite the penalties authorized for each offense defined by
state statute. This is the basic approach taken by California,
Maine, Indiana, Illinois, and Colorado, although the actual
1 82
sentencing provisions vary substantially from state to state.
The other approach to sentencing reform was taken by
Minnesota. In that approach, large-scale legislative reform of
the statutory sentencing provisions was not required. Minnesota opted for sentencing guidelines which can be added to
most current sentencing systems with little legislative
modification. The legislature need only appoint a sentencing
commission with responsibility for formulating guidelines that
take into consideration the current practices and experiences
district court judges utilize
of trial judges and mandate that
83
the guidelines thus produced.
In comparing the wisdom of the two approaches, several
factors should be weighed. The first approach requires an exhaustive review of current statutes and a legislative package
detailing the new sentencing provisions that will attach to each
and every offense defined by the criminal code. Such a process
is, of course, subject to all of the convulsions of the legislative
process. As one commentator has observed:
182. See supra text accompanying notes 60-108.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 109-119.
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Once a determinate sentencing bill is before a legislative
body, it takes only an eraser and pencil to make a oneyear "presumptive sentence" into a six-year sentence
for the same offense. The delicate scheme of priorities
in any well-conceived sentencing proposal can be
torpedoed
by amendment with ease and political
4
appeal.18
The sentencing guidelines approach offers substantive
reform without the necessity of large-scale legislative revision.
It also draws trial court judges, who will have the continuing
responsibility of sentencing the convicted adult felon, into the
process. In addition, the legislature may require in the enabling legislation that the guidelines specifically consider current
sentencing practices and correctional resources, thereby
forestalling a disastrous explosion in prison population.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The legislature should create a
Sentencing Guidelines Commission to construct sentencing
guidelines and mandate that district court judges utilize the
guidelines constructed by the Commission in sentencing the
convicted adultfelon.
Sentencing guidelines' 8" would operate to assist the trial
judge in selecting a proper sentence for the convicted felon.
The guidelines would recommend a sentence or range within
which the judge may sentence, taking into consideration the
severity of the offense and the seriousness of the offender's
prior criminal record. The sentences recommended by the
guidelines should be based on several factors: 1) current
sentencing practices of the district courts; 2) current correctional practices as they pertain to the actual amount of time
served in prison; 3) current institutional populations and
resources; and 4) substantive input by the legislature, judges,
and the public at large regarding the proper framework for
criminal sentencing.
The recommended sentences would be advisory in nature.
Trial judges would retain discretion to sentence outside of the
guideline ranges where exceptional factors exist. The sentenc184. F. ZIMRING, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 17 (Dec.
1976).
185. See generally, e.g., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 114.
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ing judge would be required to provide a written explanation of
his reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines so that the
commission could identify changing standards and weaknesses
in the guidelines. The commission would have no power to
challenge a particular sentence or to sanction the sentencing
judge.
RECOMMENDATION 3: The legislature should enact legislation that mandates the quarterly vesting of earned good time
credits.
Equitable decision making in criminal sanctioning must
take into consideration correctional practices that affect the
length of sentence actually served, as well as the sentencing
decision itself. Good time presently operates to reduce only the
maximum judicially imposed sentence and does not reduce the
186
amount of time to be served below the minimum sentence.
Any or all of the good time an inmate has earned may be revoked for the violation of prison rules and regulations. 18
The system, as presently constituted, provides the correctional official and parole board a varying range of institutional
sanctioning power. Inmates whose sentence is one in which the
minimum is very close in length to the maximum sentence
(e.g., a 19-to-20 year sentence for involuntary manslaughter),
can earn little good time and the correctional official must rely
on other measures for institutional discipline. At the other extreme, for inmates who receive a relatively short minimum
sentence and a lengthy maximum sentence (e.g., a 5-to-50 year
sentence for armed robbery), the prison official and parole
board retain a power to punish institutional infractions tantamount to that of the sentencing judge.
The proposal for vesting of earned good time would
restrict the amount of good time which the parole board could
revoke to that time which the inmate has earned during the
186. See supra text accompanying notes 124-139.
187. Neither the rules of the parole board nor the rules of the State Penitentiary place any
limit on the amount of good time that may be withheld or revoked from an inmate for
violation of the institutional rules. The Wyoming State PenitentiaryInmate Rules Handbook, however, lists loss of good time as a possible sanction for only class I and class II offenses. WYOMING INMATE RULES HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 130.
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last quarter. 188 In addition, the board would be allowed to place
the errant inmate in a "time-out" or non-earning status for a
specified period of time during which the inmate would be ineligible to earn any good time.
The practical effect of this recommendation would be that
an inmate who serves three months in the institution would
earn X amount of good time. Once the inmate completed serving the fourth month of confinement without violation, the
good time that was earned during the first month would vest:

it would not be subject to revocation. In this way, the board
and the correctional official could revoke up to one quarter's

accumulation of good time, but no more. They could also place
the inmate in a "time-out" status for a prescribed period of
time.
CONCLUSION

Implementation of the reforms presented here would
enhance the equity of criminal sentencing and punishment

without unduly restricting the exercise of judicial discretion.
Judges would still be able to sentence outside of the sentencing
guidelines, though their discretion would largely be structured

within the guidelines. Correctional authorities would retain
the full range of disciplinary measures presently available to
sanction institutional misbehavior.

Parole would continue to function, though its operation
might necessitate revision depending upon the specific structure of the sentencing guidelines developed. For example, if
the guidelines were structured to provide fixed-term sentenc-

ing by the district court judges, it might be necessary to
remove discretionary

board. 189

release decisions from the parole

Similarly, should the guidelines retain the current

188. See Conrad, The Law and its Promises:Flat Terms, Good Time, and FlexibleIncarceration, in DETERMINATE SENTENCING, supra note 63, at 109, for a compelling discussion of
the need for allowing good time to vest.
189. The sentencing guidelines proposed here could operate either under a fixed-term sentencing system or the current indeterminate sentencing scheme. Should the decision be made
that fixed-term sentencing replaces our current system, the guidelines could be structured very much along the lines of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines. Discretionary
parole release under a fixed-term sentencing scheme, however, appears cumbersome.
Where the prison term pronounced by the sentencing judge is fixed in length, the discretionary nature of the parole release decision becomes obsolete-all offenders will be
released upon service of their fixed-term sentence, minus any earned good time. In the
event fixed-term sentencing is preferred, the state may wish to enact a mandatory parole
release period which must be served by all prison inmates upon release from confinement.
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indeterminate sentencing structure, the legislature might wish
to consider the option of allowing good time credits to accrue
toward the minimum sentence for the limited purpose of accelerating parole release eligibility.1 90 In this manner, virtually
all inmates would earn good time credits; mandatory release
would continue to be governed by good time reductions from
the maximum sentence only; and inmates would see the direct
influence of their institutional behavior on their release
options.

190. Should the legislature choose to enact sentencing guidelines which retain the present indeterminate sentencing structure, it might also consider the option of allowing good time
to accrue toward the minimum sentence for the limited purpose of accelerating parole
release eligibility. Under such a system, all inmates, except those serving life sentences
for which no definite term of years can be assumed, would earn good time reductions to
their sentences. Good time would accrue to the maximum sentence, as it presently does,
to accelerate mandatory discharge. Good time would also accrue toward the minimum
sentence to accelerate parole eligibility. The inmate would not be automatically released,
but the Board of Parole would have parole discharge as an option once the minimum
sentence, minus earned good time, had been served.
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